Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the Contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship - Economic Theory and Practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina by Schmid, Andreas
 Andreas Schmid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the 
Contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship 
  - 
Economic Theory and Practical Implications: 
The Case of North Carolina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diplomarbeit im Studiengang Gesundheitsökonomie, betreut durch 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Oberender, 
Universität Bayreuth, Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Lehrstuhl für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre IV, insb. Wirtschaftstheorie. 
Abstract 
Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der optimalen Vertragsgestaltung zwischen Krankenversi-
cherern und Leistungserbringern. Ausgehend von verschiedenen Aspekten der Vertrags-
theorie erfolgt eine Spezifikation auf die Besonderheiten des Gesundheitswesens. Der 
Fokus liegt einerseits auf einer Angleichung der Anreizstrukturen ex ante sowie anderer-
seits auf einer effizienten Abwicklung von Interessenskonflikten nach Vertragsabschluss 
(ex post). Die theoriebasierten Folgerungen werden schließlich der Situation in North 
Carolina, USA, gegenübergestellt, welche sich durch die dort vorliegende Rahmenord-
nung als Referenzpunkt eignet. Ein Exkurs zum amerikanischen Gesundheitswesen ver-
mittelt dem Leser den nötigen Hintergrund. Eine kritische Diskussion der Ergebnisse 
schließt die Arbeit ab. 
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The paper is concerned with the efficient organization of contractual relationships be-
tween health insurers and providers. An introduction to relevant aspects of contract theory 
is followed by their adaptation to the characteristics of the health care system. The focus 
lies on an ex ante alignment of incentive structures as well as on an efficient handling of 
conflicts of interest once a contract has been sealed (ex post). The theory based conclu-
sions are contrasted with the situation in North Carolina, USA. Due to the implemented 
regulation, this state is well suited to serve as a reference. An excursus to the American 
health care system provides the reader with the necessary background. A discussion of 
results completes the paper. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the Research Project 
The relationship between patient and physician is at the core of every health system. On this 
premise, the obviously significant spread of variation of health system organization across 
the world is astonishing. In looking for explanations, the following is likely to be part of the 
reason: Due to various factors like asymmetry of knowledge the patient is rarely capable of 
controlling all the relevant factors of this relationship. The physician herself, however, is 
only somewhat suitable to pursue the role of an unbiased steward of the patient‘s interests 
as she is affected by a range of contradicting incentives. Consequently, a third party is 
commonly required to act as a mediator, opening up a range of options.
1
 
The state could play a decisive role, e.g. by extensively regulating various aspects of health-
care delivery or by producing health services directly. Problems arise if political decisions 
are ill informed or, even worse, based on lobbyist influence and partisan ideology rather 
than on specific needs. Giving more responsibility to employers who have performed such 
tasks is another option. But potential abuse of medical information and limited capabilities 
of small firms are only two of several reasons that weaken this argument.
2
 
A third option to be considered is stewardship through private health insurers. Provided that 
a competitive market can be ensured, several of the disadvantages mentioned above could 
be overcome. This goes along with new problems and challenges. To manage the various 
relationships between the different actors in the health system a high degree of freedom has 
to be given to insurance companies. They must be able to influence behavior of providers 
and patients, tailoring sophisticated contracts that account for the complex system of incen-
tives and needs. The latter can be attempted through loose networks as well as through 
owned, completely integrated organizations, each having its own, very specific characteris-
tics.
3
 
1.2 Scope of the Analysis 
This potentially significant power in the hands of insurance companies causes risks that 
must be taken seriously. To address these issues adequately it is necessary to investigate the 
behavior of insurance companies under these market oriented circumstances. Although 
there are a number of worthwhile aspects to consider, this paper focuses on the relationship 
                                                 
1
  Cf. Arrow 1963, p. 947. 
2
  Cf. Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, pp. 431-439. 
3
  The advisory council for the observation of developments in the health sector explicitly elaborate on the 
option to allow for selective contracting of providers through insurance companies; cf. SVRBEG 2005, p. 
23 and p. 47. Also see Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 439. 
 2 
between insurer and provider. Since a broad continuum of organizational forms to structure 
the insurer provider relationship is available, it is essential to understand which parameters 
influence the insurers‘ decisions on how to structure these relationships and which configu-
rations are likely. Finally, these results have to be assessed by their impact on the overall 
goals of a health care system.
4
 
To reach this goal the following hypothesis has been formed which will be tested in the 
course of this paper, thereby trying to either verify or falsify its assumptions and conclu-
sions in the described context: In a market driven health system insurers find efficient ways 
of coordinating their contractual relationships with providers by pursuing appropriate 
forms of vertical integration. The thereby emerging organizations do this by efficiently 
overcoming problems posed through diverging interests and incentives. This helps to ac-
complish social goals as defined by the society, i.e. guaranteeing all citizens basic cover-
age. 
To compare theoretical with real-world outcomes the health care market of the state of 
North Carolina, U.S., will serve as a benchmark. This choice is reasonable, as in the United 
States a ―consequence of competition law‘s commitment to consumers has been its willing-
ness to accommodate the preferences of health insurers (acting as purchasers of health care 
services) rather than those of physicians and hospitals (acting as sellers of health care ser-
vices).‖5 
Going along with this focus only the supply-side of health care services is considered in this 
paper, demand-side questions of incentivizing or controlling patients are omitted.
6
 
1.3 Approach 
To achieve this scope the following approach has been chosen, which is illustrated in Figure 
1. First, Chapter One gives a brief survey of the methodology applied in this paper. 
The basis for the analysis is set in Chapter Two, which presents the underlying economic 
theory. The goal of this chapter is to equip the reader with all economic tools employed in 
the course of this paper and to identify a branch of economic theory which is suitable to 
explain the research question. Outlining the choice of theory and giving a brief introduction 
into economic paradigms in general and the concepts of New Institutional Economics in 
particular lead to a more in-depth illustration of the different branches of contract theory. 
Principal-agent theory and transaction cost theory are identified as suitable means for the 
                                                 
4
  At the end, economics as a science is interested in societal benefits. Not only the advantages of the in-
volved but also of the affected people are relevant. Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 18-19. 
5
  Sage, Hyman and Greenberg 2003, p. 38. 
6
  See Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000, pp. 566-567, for the different aspects of demand-side and supply-side 
measures. 
 3 
purpose of this paper and are elaborated in greater detail. All this provides a theory-based 
framework which not only identifies parameters that are relevant in the decision making 
process of economic actors but also allows theory-based conclusions on incentive compati-
bility and organizational form. 
 
Figure 1: Analytical Framework 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Chapter Three identifies societal norms which set the expectations that the health care mar-
ket has to live up to. This provides an external benchmark in which the theory-based out-
comes as well as the outcomes actually observed in North Carolina are measured against 
later on. Furthermore, it takes all the parameters identified as relevant in chapter two and 
specifies them according to their prevalence in the health sector. 
In Chapter Four the economic framework is finally combined with the specified parameters. 
After briefly establishing the applicability of this framework theory-based predictions for 
each of the two aspects – principal-agent theory as well as transaction cost theory – are de-
rived. This produces a set of outcomes that describe incentive compatibility and organiza-
tional form as well as general societal outcomes. 
The introduction of practical examples has to be conducted in a very careful manner to 
avoid misconceptions. This is especially critical in an area like health care, as country spe-
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 4 
cifics play such a decisive role in organizational matters as well as in outcomes. Thus, a 
whole excursus (Chapter Five) is dedicated to the United States‘ health care system to pro-
vide the reader with the background knowledge necessary to appreciate the ‗case study‘ of 
the state of North Carolina. The rest of the paper follows the same structure as the preceding 
chapters, which means that a reader who is familiar with the peculiarities of the United 
States‘ health system may want to skip this insert. 
Chapter Six begins with a brief introduction into North Carolina‘s state characteristics. In 
greater detail it covers market characteristics and other aspects which might present con-
founding variables. Then, observations for the assumptions and parameters used in the theo-
retical analysis are compiled, drawing from North Carolina specific literature and expert 
interviews. The outcomes with regard to incentive compatibility and organizational form 
are elaborated and finally the general outcomes on the predefined societal norms are stated. 
Chapter Seven finally confronts the assumptions, parameters and outcomes from the theory 
application in Chapter Four with the actual observations in Chapter Six. Discrepancies are 
identified and different ways to explain them are looked at in more detail. This is supple-
mented with a consideration of limitations of this research project and suggestions for fur-
ther research. 
Chapter Eight concludes this paper by briefly summarizing key findings. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Literature Review 
As the scope of this research project is rather broad a multi-method approach has been ap-
plied. Initially extensive literature research has been conducted to feed into the theory-based 
chapters as well as to identify previously published evidence on the North Carolinian health 
care market. The primary source was the ISI Web of Science® database. Unfortunately, 
systematic search strings did not produce meaningful results. The main reason might be 
that, while on the one hand the topic is very narrow, on the other side the terminology 
which is used in New Institutional Economics as well as in health services research is vast 
and hardly standardized. Due to this issue the research strategy has been slightly amended. 
Originally, the focus was intended to be on ‗managed care organizations‘. However, this did 
not prove to be useful as there are many different definitions with varying purposes.
7
 Thus, 
the focus has been put on generic terms of contracting between insurers and providers. 
                                                 
7
  According to Greene 2003, pp. 21-22, managed care can be defined in a broad sense as ―[s]ystems and 
techniques used to control the use of healthcare services. [It] Includes a review of medical necessity, in-
centives to use certain providers, and case management. [And it includes] The body of clinical, financial 
and organizational activities designed to ensure the provision of appropriate healthcare services in a cost-
 5 
1.4.2 Qualitative Interviews 
Complementary to literature based research, qualitative interviews were conducted, aiming 
at key stakeholders in the North Carolinian health care market. Such an approach is useful 
to gain insight into past and present decision-making processes as well as to learn about 
potential future developments.
8
 In the context of this research project this was used to cap-
ture the stakeholders‘ perception of certain assumptions and assessments which are made in 
the literature. Thus, both background information and reasons for observable phenomena 
and outcomes in and around the insurer-provider relationship can be elaborated.
9
 
As readily available publications do not cover the specified research questions, a primary 
data collection had to be conducted. This research project was approved by the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Public Health-Nursing IRB for research ethics.
10
 
In early November 2006 stakeholders and key informants were identified and contacted in 
close collaboration with two senior faculty members of the Department of Health Policy 
and Administration at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The goal was to cov-
er the perspectives of insurance companies, providers, consumers and the public regulatory 
entity. Finally, six individuals were purposefully selected, two from the insurance side, one 
as a provider representative, two professionals in the field of patient and consumer advoca-
cy, and one expert from the public regulatory entity. Without exception all participants are 
in senior positions and have prominent reputations for their expertise in their fields. No in-
dividual has less than ten years of experience in the North Carolinian health care market, 
and most of them have worked as professionals for much longer. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. 
All interviews were conducted in late January and early February 2007. A semi-structured 
interview guide (see Table 5, p. 100) served as an outline for all interviews. Six open-ended 
questions ensured that all relevant topics were covered without restricting the flexibility 
needed to follow up on unanticipated insights. A test-interview was conducted which al-
lowed for revision and clarification of the wording of questions. The interviews, which 
lasted between 45 and 75 minutes, were taped and later transcribed. For a systematic analy-
                                                                                                                                                  
efficient manner. …[Managed care is] Any system of health payment or delivery arrangements where 
the plan attempts to control or coordinate use of health services by its enrolled members in order to con-
tain health expenditures, improve quality, or both. Arrangements often involve a defined delivery system 
of providers with some form of contractual arrangement with the plan.‖ Also see Reinhardt 2001, pp. 
985-986. 
8
  Cf. Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000, p. 239. 
9
  The course of action was discussed with faculty of HPAA, SPH, UNC at Chapel Hill; as background 
literature served Rubin and Rubin 2005 and documented applications of qualitative interviewing like in 
Gordon, Waines et al. 2007, pp. 58-69. 
10
  For some background information and a critical assessment of ethics panels in the U.S. see Cohen 2007, 
n.p. 
 6 
sis, the transcripts were coded with professional qualitative data analysis software (NVivo7, 
QSR International, Doncaster, Victoria, Australia). 
This approach is subject to several limitations, many of which are due to time and resource 
restrictions. For example, the number of interviewees is small, and, although all experts 
were carefully selected, this may have introduced some bias. Furthermore, the principal 
investigator had to conduct all steps individually although tasks like coding are preferably 
performed by at least two independent investigators.
11
 Taking into account that these and 
similar caveats apply, the results nonetheless should be reasonably accurate, especially as 
ambiguities have been validated through literature or independent experts.
12
 
2 Economic Theory 
2.1 Choice of Theory 
Derived from the hypothesis outlined in chapter 1.2, two basic requirements a theory has to 
fulfill in order to successfully answer the research question can be stated. Firstly, it must 
give insight into the incentive structure of economic actors and its impact on their interac-
tion. Secondly, a toolset to investigate different modes of structuring economic relationships 
has to be provided. The following chapter gives a brief introduction into a field of economic 
theory that aims to explain both aspects. 
Coase 1937 confronted his colleagues with an inquiry into ―The Nature of the Firm‖, trying 
to elaborate why it is sometimes reasonable to organize transactions through the organiza-
tional structure of a firm rather than through the market‘s price mechanism, and what rele-
vant parameters influence this decision.
13
 Williamson’s book ―Markets and Hierarchies‖ 
drew from this original work and was another major step stone that came closer to a more 
recent definition of a certain part of the research program that is now known as New Institu-
tional Economics:
14
 ―The object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transac-
tions by alternative modes of governance – principally spot markets, various long-term con-
tracts (hybrids), and hierarchies.‖15 During the 70 years from Coase‘s essay to today, New 
                                                 
11
  See Varvasovszky and Brugha 2000 for an introduction into the ―to dos and not to dos‖ of stakeholder 
analysis and Rubin and Rubin 2005, who cover the interviewing aspects in more depth. 
12
  Most notably one informal interview was conducted with a senior health services researcher, who has 
extensive experience in North Carolina‘s health care market. Field notes were taken to document this in-
terview. 
13
  For an overview on intention and impact of his research see Coase 2005, pp. 31-39. 
14
  See Williamson 1975. Williamson 1991 provides a more succinct overview including some newer ele-
ments. 
15
  Williamson 2005a, p. 1. The issue he raises is closely related to the hypothesis and the analysis of this 
paper. Both look into different forms of coordinating relations between economic protagonists and try to 
derive conclusions through looking at different parameters. For example see Ménard 2005, p. 286, who 
describes Williamson’s discrete alignment principle: ―calculative agents operating in a competitive envi-
 7 
Institutional Economics, a field that he had helped to open up, has vastly expanded and dif-
ferentiated.
16
 As this field is constantly being developed and many of its segments are still 
subject to controversial discussions, the theoretical setting that is essential for this paper is 
outlined in the following paragraphs.
17
 
2.2 New Institutional Economics – The Framework 
2.2.1 Defining New Institutional Economics – An Attempt 
New Institutional Economics loosens the strict assumptions made in neoclassical theory to 
expand its applicability and increase its power to explain real-world phenomena. In contrast 
to earlier critics of neoclassic theory, it does not reject marginal analysis but provides a new 
foundation through a range of innovative concepts and hypotheses.
18
 Before going into de-
tail it is advised to have a general idea of what the rudiments of this stream of economics 
are. 
Using a definition proposed by Homann and Suchanek 2005 economics is concerned with 
both explaining and shaping conditions and consequences of interactions which are based 
on individual considerations of advantages and disadvantages. This definition stresses the 
point that economics goes beyond a purely positivistic analysis, but is also able to play a 
creative role suggesting solutions to various problems.
19
 In its core it embraces a threefold 
concept of economics, which is briefly outlined at this point. 
Firstly, rational choice theory allows to analyze and predict individuals‘ behavior and ac-
tions. It is centered on the assumption that individuals maximize their utility under restric-
tions, which is reflected in the classic model of the homo oeconomicus.
20
 
Secondly, the interactions between the individuals are put in the focus of the analysis. 
Looking at modern societies the interaction and exchange between individuals – for exam-
ple with regard to scarce resources – pose the key problems. The dilemmas that originate 
from frictions between common and conflicting interests raise the question of how to over-
come this situation.
21
 
                                                                                                                                                  
ronment will adopt the mode of organization that fits comparatively better with the attributes of the 
transaction at stake.‖ 
16
  For landmarks in the development of NIE with references to important authors and papers see Ménard 
2005, pp. 283-284. 
17
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 3. 
18
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 2-3. 
19
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 347-351. Hurley 2000, pp. 55-118, discusses different approaches 
of normative economics in the health sector. 
20
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 363. 
21
  This is in accordance with Simon 1957, pp. 196-197, who states that Robinson Crusoe, alone on his 
island, is only a very first step to understand decision making in social groups. Buchanan 2001, p. 28, 
shares this emphasis on interactions by contrasting the traditional definition of economics, mainly based 
on scarcity and maximizing behavior, with his definition of economics as ―catallaxy or catallactics, the 
 8 
Thirdly, institutions build the brace that connects rational choice theory and interaction 
theory. They can help to overcome dilemmas that would otherwise prevent a successful 
interaction that is in both individuals‘ best interest. Since institutions are conditions and 
restrictions as well as consequences of individuals‘ behavior, they are relevant in almost all 
situations.
22
 
The following paragraphs define and explain terms and assumptions that are an integral part 
of this concept of economics, some of which already have been mentioned in the preceding 
lines, others are yet to be introduced. The list, however, is neither conclusive nor is its dis-
cussion exhaustive. It is purely intended to give a brief introduction into the analytical tools 
applied in this paper.
23
 Key notions will be characterized in-depth later, when needed. 
2.2.2 The Individual in Economic Analysis 
2.2.2.1 Methodological Individualism 
The above definition refers to a seemingly trivial ―individual‖. However, many protagonists 
in the field of economic research – such as firms, organizations, or the state – are compo-
sites rather than real individuals. It is important to understand that these entities consist of a 
number of individuals with different intentions, ideas and goals. Thus, picturing such prota-
gonists as collective entities by simply transferring attributes that are characteristic for truly 
individual agents, like a person, is misleading. Any behavior assumed for the larger entity 
has to be consistent with the outcomes that may result from the interactions of the agents 
that form it. This notion is known as methodological individualism.
24
 
2.2.2.2 The Individual as Maximand under Restrictions 
Individuals try to maximize their own benefit or utility. The term utility is used in a more 
general sense compared to its traditional purely monetary meaning. It is taken into account 
that the perception of utility is a subjective matter and can also relate to non-monetary 
payoffs.
25
 Another important aspect is the uncertainty of payoffs, which leads to the general 
use of expectation values. Since wishes are basically unlimited but resources are scarce, 
                                                                                                                                                  
‗science of exchanges‘, including the whole realm of voluntary interaction between and among persons, 
and including the development and operation of the complex network of institutions that facilitate such 
interaction.‖ 
22
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 352-354 and pp. 36-40.  
23
  For more profund introduction see Furubotn and Richter 2005, Homann and Suchanek 2005, Erlei, 
Leschke and Sauerland 1999, or Göbel 2002. 
24
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 3, Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 26, and Erlei, Leschke and Sauerl-
and 1999, p. 6. 
25
  Some authors criticize the inclusion of non-monetary payoffs as in their opinion this might result in a 
loss of analytical clarity. Cf. Göbel 2002, p. 25. 
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constraints emerge. These can be presented through budget, technical, or social restrictions. 
When maximizing its utility under given restrictions the individual acts rationally.
26
 
2.2.2.3 Bounded Rationality  
However, these actions are not perfect. In order to make educated, rational decisions infor-
mation is needed, which comes at a certain cost. Given limited resources, these costs are 
often prohibitively high – either in absolute terms beyond the budget or in marginal terms 
trading off the expected benefits with searching costs. Thus, individuals make rational deci-
sions, but these are based on imperfect information.
27
 This is commonly known as bounded 
rationality, a term coined by Simon 1957, who refers to the relatively small capability of the 
human mind compared to the complex problems to be solved.
28
 Taking into account all 
these aspects, actors will still try to look ahead, attempting to take precautions for events 
that may come up, identifying potential contractual hazards, and then working out contrac-
tual ramifications.
29
 
2.2.2.4 Opportunisms 
A factor that increases the complexity of decision-making situations is that players are not 
wholly trustworthy or even ―self-seeking with guile‖30. They tend to disguise information or 
to deliberately distort facts. To reveal the true character of an individual is extremely costly 
and frequently impossible. Opportunism also includes cases of ―honest disagreement‖, re-
ferring to the fact that two parties may contrarily interpret a contract.
31
 In consequence of 
bounded rationality and opportunism, necessarily incomplete contracts with their own set of 
difficulties are needed to fill in, since comprehensive contracting is unfeasible under com-
plex circumstances.
32
  
2.2.3 Transactions and Transaction Costs 
Although the transaction is the ―natural unit of analysis‖,33 there are various definitions at 
hand. The one used for the purpose of this paper is: ―A transaction occurs when a good or 
                                                 
26
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 27-28. For more information on the robustness of this concept see 
Milgrom and Roberts 1992, pp. 42-43. 
27
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 4. 
28
  Cf. Simon 1957, p. 198. 
29
  Cf. Williamson 2005b, p. 46. 
30
  Williamson 1975, p. 26. 
31
  Cf. Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland 1999, p. 179. 
32
  Cf. Williamson 1975 , p. 73, and Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 5. 
33
  Williamson 2005b, p. 47. 
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service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. One stage of activity ter-
minates and another begins.‖34 
The above mentioned costs for searching information are one part of what is summarized as 
transaction costs. These costs pay tribute to the fact that, contrary to neoclassic assumptions, 
using the market place for performing transactions is not without costs.
35
 Transaction costs 
in a market are consequently defined as: costs for search and information, bargaining and 
decision making, and supervision and enforcement. Similar categories of costs apply for 
managerial or political transaction costs.
36
 In the given context, the costs arising from elabo-
rating, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts are relevant.
37
 As transaction costs 
play such a key role they will be characterized in-depth when needed. 
2.2.4 Dilemmas in Transactions and their Analytical Presentation 
However, looking at the conflicting interests only distorts the picture. There is also a com-
mon interest, which is the interest in realizing additional gains through cooperation in the 
transaction. The conflict arises over the individual contributions to the transaction and, later, 
over the distribution of the cooperation gains. It is a true dilemma, if the common interest is 
not pursued because both parties mutually expect exploitation.
38
 
The situation can be visualized if gains are understood as payoffs and all potential scenarios 
are presented. A typical example is the prisoners‘ dilemma as depicted in Figure 2. Through 
mutual cooperation each player could double her payoffs, compared to the non-cooperation 
scenario. However, as, no matter which strategy player A chooses, the preferable option for 
B always is to defect, both will opt for the non-cooperation scenario.
39
 Prima facie, it seems 
as if the individuals‘ self-interest, which features a central and very positive role in Smith 
1895, would necessarily harm the other or even both sides of the transaction, if no addition-
al measures are taken.
40
 
  
                                                 
34
  Williamson 1985, p 1. The term ―interaction‖, as used in chapter 2.2.1, is often applied by scholars who 
prefer a wider definition of transactions. For a brief discussion of this issue see Homann and Suchanek 
2005, p. 29, footnote 7. 
35
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 12-14. 
36
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 51-57. 
37
  Cf. Ménard 2005, p. 284. 
38
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 31-32. 
39
  For more information on the prisoners‘ dilemma see Holler and Illing 2003, chapter one. It should be 
noted that this dilemma structure is a heuristics that exposes the nucleolus of the analytical problem. As 
such it is quasi pre-empirical to structure the problem and elaborate the questions that have to be empiri-
cally tested. Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 362-363. 
40
  Cf. Smith 1895, p. 184. 
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  A 
  Cooperate Defect 
B 
Cooperate (3/3) (1/4) 
Defect (4/1) (2/2) 
Figure 2: Prisoners' Dilemma 
Source: Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 33. 
 
At this point it is important to note that the players have no interest in the societal gain, 
which is the sum of both players‘ payoffs. In this case the cooperation scenario would be 
preferable. The players only have a common interest in cooperation, if both of them can 
improve their situation, thereby disregarding the societal outcomes.
41
 According to the me-
thodological individualism the assumption of a collective maximand would be unsuitable.
42
  
2.2.5 Institutions, Incentives and Contracts 
The payoffs, however, which represent the incentives for the players to choose one option 
or another, can be changed.
43
 For example, it is possible that a state passes a law to discou-
rage certain uncooperative behavior. This means that, if a player chooses the defect option, 
she will be punished by the state, e.g. through a fine, which reduces her expected payoff. 
Laws are a specific, formal type of institutions, which are generally defined as a sanctioned 
set of rules that are widely known and are applied to a large number of cases.
44
 Institutions 
―define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies‖45. They are a central 
part of New Institutional Economics, especially with regard to their capability to reduce 
transaction cost by diminishing uncertainty.
46
 
In the course of this paper contracts play an important role, especially since also these de-
termine expected payoffs; for example, through allocating cooperative profits or costs. 
Some authors, however, differentiate contracts from institutions. They point out that con-
tracts are an agreement between two or another limited number of parties that cannot be 
generalized and is not generally known.
47
 They are a mode of governance rather than part of 
the institutional setting.
48
 Institutions play a role with regard to contracts. For example, 
since they provide the framework for conflict resolution, which means that their quality and 
                                                 
41
  Pareto-superior improvement refers to a situation in which at least one player improves its situation 
without reducing another player‘s utility; cf. Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland 1999, pp. 17-18. 
42
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 34 and pp. 44-45. 
43
  Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 40-42 and p. 53. 
44
  Cf. Kiwit and Voigt 1995, pp. 118-119. 
45
  North 1994, p. 360. 
46
  Cf. Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland 1999, pp. 23-24, and Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 6-9. For more 
information on institutions see North 1992. 
47
  Cf. Kiwit and Voigt 1995, pp. 118-119. 
48
  Cf. Ménard and Shirley 2005, p. 1. 
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sanctioning mechanism affect the level of transaction costs for administering a contract.
49
 
However, as for the analysis pursued in this paper, contractual variations within a given set 
of institutions are of interest, rather than the institutions themselves, these will not be elabo-
rated in greater detail.
50
 
2.3 Contract Theory 
2.3.1 The Venue of Contract Theory 
After having introduced some basic concepts, this section covers the more specific theory 
used in this paper, which is known as contract theory.
51
 However, since a fully integrated 
theory of New Institutional Economics is still missing and subsets, such as contract theory, 
lack a completely standardized typology, the following caveats apply. Since this is by far 
not a trivial problem, any conceptualization chosen can be argued citing well renowned 
scholars. The work presented by Gibbons 2004 gives valuable insight into this problem. 
To identify theory that is relevant with regard to the research questions posed in this paper 
some options are briefly sketched out in the following. Focusing on alternative theories of 
organization in economics Gibbons 2004 emphasizes that to be meaningful all theories must 
both describe integration and explicitly cover the trade-off that leads to integration for some 
transaction and not for others.
52
 According to him the major existing theories can be diffe-
rentiated in the two main categories Ex ante Incentive Alignment and Ex post Decision Go-
vernance, as presented in Table 1.  
  
                                                 
49
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 54. 
50
  A similar approach is applied by Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 136. For more information on institu-
tions and institutional change see the literature cited above or Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 471-500. 
51
  For advantages of the contract theory approach see Williamson 2002, pp. 438-443. Other segments of 
New Institutional Economics which are beyond the scope of this paper, but may nonetheless influence 
results in one way or another, are the macro-level institutions of the state, the legal system, regulation 
and institutional change; cf. Ménard and Shirley 2005, pp. 1-18.  
52
  Cf. Gibbons 2004, p. 5. Integration is defined in greater detail in chapter 2.3.4.3. 
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Ex ante Incentive Alignment Ex post Decision Governance 
Incentive Systems Property Rights Adaptation Rent-Seeking 
Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1991 
Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1994 
Holmstrom and Ti-
role 1991 
Holmstrom 1999 
Grossman and Hart 
1986 
Hart and Moore 
1990 
Hart 1995 
Simon 1953 
Williamson 1971 
Williamson 1975 
Williamson 1991 
Klein and Murphy 
1997 
Klein and Murphy 
1988 
Klein 1996 
Klein 2000a 
Williamson 1971 
Williamson 1979 
Williamson 1985 
Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian 1978 
Klein 1988 
Klein 2000b 
Table 1: Branches of Contract Theory 
Source: Gibbons 2004, p. 39. 
 
The authors cited are representatives of the subcategories Incentive Systems and Property 
Rights as well as Adaptation and Rent Seeking.
53
  
Looking at the scope of this paper as outlined in chapter 1.2, two aspects are more relevant 
than others. Firstly, the incentive structure between players has to be analyzed. Secondly, 
different forms of organization have to be scrutinized with regard to their efficiency. The 
category Incentive Systems, mainly representing agency theory, is by definition suitable to 
shed some light onto the first issue. For the second one it is reasonable to look at the main 
category Ex post Governance as a whole. This represents an approach taken by Williamson, 
who merges the Adaptation and the Rent-seeking aspect in his so-called transaction cost 
theory.
54
 Examining ways how to confront agents with incentives to act in their principal‘s 
best interest is the main focus of agency theory, whereas transaction cost theory aims to 
explain ―the existence and properties of alternative modes of organization and the trade-offs 
among them.‖55 
Property rights theory is also a very valuable source to gain insight into these issues; how-
ever, with regard to the limited scope of this paper it receives only consideration as far as 
                                                 
53
  Cf. Gibbons 2004, p. 39. The way in which he explicitly states the formal assumptions made for each 
individual subcategory helps to understand the differences between various types. To stay within the 
scope of this paper the following will focus on the main categories only. See Williamson 2005b, p. 44, 
for a similar schema. 
54
  Cf. Gibbons 2004, p. 12; Gibbons divides Williamson‘s theory into two different branches. For the pur-
pose of this paper these are interpreted as one comprehensive theory. 
55
  Ménard 2005, p. 281. Although agency theory can – to a certain degree – be used to explain and analyze 
vertical integration (cf. Gibbons 2004, pp. 14-16), the way it is used in this paper is strictly focused on 
its capacity with regard to incentives. 
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being relevant for the two main concepts that are applied in the following: principal-agent 
theory and transaction cost theory.
56
 
2.3.2 Principal-Agent Theory 
2.3.2.1 Measurability and Information Asymmetry 
Principal-agent theory begins with the fact that generally nobody can do everything by her-
self, be it due to costs or complexity of a business, and that specialization and cooperation 
can produce various additional benefits. Consequently, tasks are often delegated to some-
body else, for example through hiring.
57
 The actor who does this by offering a contract is 
called the principal, the actor who accepts or rejects the offer is the agent.
58
 
From the most basic and naïve perspective, a complete contract would overcome the pris-
oners‘ dilemma situation presented in Figure 2 by spelling out each party‘s duties in any 
possible circumstances, including all potential breaches.
59
 Introducing a key assumption of 
principal-agent theory – asymmetry of information – this changes. The latter one implies 
that the agent entertains some informational advantage over the principal, either ex ante 
(precontractual: adverse selection), or ex post (postcontractual: moral hazard).
60
 Thus, op-
portunistic behavior of the agent is possible. With regard to moral hazard hidden informa-
tion as well as hidden action are relevant. In the first case, the agent acquires more informa-
tion than the principal, in the second the agent‘s efforts cannot be observed by the princip-
al.
61
 Consequently, securing a ‗plain vanilla‘ contract is not achievable at all, or is at least 
not desirable due to the excessively high costs that would go along with searching for in-
formation or measuring efforts.
62
 If – as a last requirement – the two actors‘ objective func-
tions differ, as illustrated in the following, the moral-hazard arises as a problem.
63
 
2.3.2.2 Objective Functions and Risk 
Taking into account that each actor aims at maximizing her own utility, and assuming basic 
utility and production functions, the dilemma becomes explicit. The principal‘s utility is 
                                                 
56
  The choice of this terminology does not imply that transaction cost play no or no important role in agen-
cy theory. Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland 1999, pp. 69-228, embrace both theories under the key word 
„transaction costs― but differentiate them by linking the first one to measurement costs and characteriz-
ing the second one through governance costs.  
57
  Cf. Sappington 1991, p. 45, and Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 25. 
58
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 564. 
59
  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 127, also for requirements necessary for complete contracting includ-
ing a more specific definition. 
60
  As this paper aims at the second part only, adverse selection is not considered in more detail. For more 
information on adverse selection see Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 222-246. 
61
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 200. See also Göbel 2002, pp. 98-103. 
62
  Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland 1999 identify measurement costs as a central element of New Institutional 
Economics. The applicable chapters give interesting insight from this viewpoint.  
63
  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, pp. 128-131 and 170. 
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defined through the agent‘s effort e, a random variable θ, and the remuneration r which is 
provided to the agent.
64
 
UP = c(e) + θ – r (1) 
The agent benefits from the remuneration r, but faces losses through her efforts e. 
UA = r – c(e) (2) 
Consequently, a rise in r reduces UP but increases UA. Just the opposite is true for e. This 
confronts the agent with the incentive to minimize her efforts and to increase r. The random 
variable introduces risk, which is important, if concrete solutions to this problem set have to 
be considered. 
2.3.2.3 Facing the Problem: Incentive Payment 
Given hidden information and hidden action being given, the agent‘s efforts are difficult to 
observe, and she is likely to pursue her own interest rather than her principal‘s interest. To 
overcome this, the agent must be held responsible for outcomes, for example through incen-
tive contracts.
65
 In the ideal world the optimal and respectively efficient incentive contract 
reserves a franchising fee f for the principal, and the (risk neutral) agent receives the full 
residual income minus the franchising fee, but nothing else. The fee f is set equal to the 
agent‘s reservation utility, which is the minimum requirement for her to willingly accept the 
contract offer.
66
 
UP = f (3) 
UA = c(e) + θ – f (4) 
In this simplified case the goals of both parties are perfectly aligned and the agent accepts 
the full risk. She chooses the efficient level of e, balancing marginal costs and marginal 
benefits. The term incentive compatibility describes such a successful alignment of interests 
between principal and agent.
67
 
                                                 
64
  The model is based on Sappington 1991, pp. 46-52. Variables are named differently to fit with the mod-
els used in chapter 4.2. 
65
  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 240. According to Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 559, an incentive 
contract is given, ―if the contractual party, who is unable to observe the other party‘s quality or activity, 
offers the other side an economic incentive to tell the truth or behave well.― 
66
  Cf. Sappington 1991, pp. 46-48, also for a definition of the franchising fee f and the general reasoning 
why this holds true. 
67
  Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 559, provide a definition of incentive compatibility: ―It describes an 
agency contract in which the principal maximizes his utility subject to the utility-maximizing behavior of 
his agent. Example: The principal, knowing his agent‘s response function, offers him a certain profit 
share as an incentive.‖ This does not imply an identical level of payoffs, but says that a cooperative 
strategy yields the relatively highest benefit for both. Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 34 and pp. 44-
45. 
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However, most agents are risk averse, for example if they cannot spread the risk over dif-
ferent investments.
68
 Consequently, they require a risk premium. Through this a trade-off 
between more high powered incentives and risk insulation comes into existence. To deter-
mine the efficient contract, the risk premium has to be calculated, which is positively related 
to the mean and the variance of the random variable θ together with a measure of the indi-
vidual‘s absolute risk aversion.69 
A number of factors influence the random variable. First and most obvious, environmental 
circumstances which are independent of the agent‘s performance can impact outcomes. 
Second, the measurement of the agent‘s performance itself is often not perfect. Third, per-
formance itself can become random, if external factors impact on the agent herself. If any of 
those parameters increase, the risk premium increases also. A higher risk premium reduces 
overall efficiency, if the principal herself can bear the risk more easily. Generally, to reach 
an efficient contract, costs of bearing risk have to be balanced against the benefits from pro-
viding incentives.
70
 
2.3.3 Preliminary Assessment 
The feasibility of designing efficient principal-agent incentive contracts relies on some key 
assumptions. Firstly, all contingencies are known to all parties in advance. This includes not 
only the principal‘s knowledge of the agent‘s reservation level utility. But it also implies 
that, although the actors might not be fully aware of specific future states of nature, they 
still have a precise understanding of which states could occur and what their probability 
distribution looks like, i.e., the distribution of the random variable θ.71 Secondly, the con-
tract execution does not present any further problems, and thirdly, once concluded, the con-
tract persists indefinitely. However, several scholars, most prominently Williamson, argue 
that a range of other circumstances make such, in a certain way complete, contracts imposs-
ible, as the assumptions needed to make this work ―vaporize maladaptation and strategizing 
during contract implementation‖72. The reasons for this criticism are outlined in more detail 
below. 
                                                 
68
  Risk aversion refers to a situation in which a player who is offered the choice between two outcomes 
with identical means but different variances opts for the one with the smaller spread. Cf. Goldberg 2005, 
p. 493.  
69
  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 210; The formula for the risk premium is ½*r(I)*Var (I) with I and 
Var(I) being mean and variance of the random variable θ and r(I) being the actor‘s coefficient for abso-
lute risk aversion for gambles with mean I. 
70
  Milgrom and Roberts 1992, pp. 207-208. 
71
  Cf. Sappington 1991, pp. 47 and 61.  
72
  Williamson 2005b, pp. 44, footnote 4. See also Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 251. 
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Despite this fundamental criticism principal-agent theory can contribute valuable insight to 
this analysis. It helps to exemplify the incentive structure between different players and to 
identify states of incentive compatibility and moral hazard conditions.
73
 Furthermore, sev-
eral concepts that are currently applied to structure relationships between two actors, for 
example incentive payments or pay-for-performance, heavily draw from this stream of 
theory.
74
 
To mitigate the caveats posed in principal-agent theory, chapter 2.3.4 introduces a transac-
tion cost based approach, following mainly Williamson. It allows for ex post control meas-
ures, an aspect which is omitted in the principal-agent approach due to its assumed ability to 
foresee all contingencies, as outlined above.
75
 According to the systematics described in 
Table 1, this more precisely means a step from Ex ante Incentive Alignment to Ex post De-
cision Governance, thereby adding the aspect of choice between different forms of econom-
ic organization. This scenario assumes risk neutral actors. Thus, it omits the risk sharing 
aspect, but focuses on the trade-off between incentive margins, and does not discriminate 
actors as principal and agent. Contracts are incomplete, which means that not all contingen-
cies are taken care of ex ante.
76
 
2.3.4 Transaction Cost Theory 
2.3.4.1 Setting the Scene 
The main insight that distinguishes the transaction cost approach from principal-agent 
theory is to acknowledge that there are relevant costs for bargaining after a contract has 
been signed. These (transaction) costs are triggered by events that had not been anticipated 
when the original contract was drafted.
77
 One reason may be that environmental parameters 
have changed and both partners would benefit from a readjustment of the contract. A sup-
plier-sales relationship can serve as an example: Assuming that the supplier can only pro-
duce item A or item B and that the original contract was signed over number x of items A, a 
change in the consumer demand structure – now suddenly favoring item B, promising sales 
                                                 
73
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 559. 
74
  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 391. See Joskow 2005, pp. 326-327, for a timeline concept that puts 
ex ante incentive alignment and ex post control together with other aspects in a logic order, thereby illu-
strating how the different steps relate to each other. 
75
  Cf. Gibbons 2004, p. 10. 
76
  Cf. Allen and Lueck 2005, pp. 475-476, and Williamson 2005b, pp. 44-45. The risk neutrality assumption 
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the aim of this paper. Also see Goldberg 2005, pp. 493-495, for a more extensive discussion of the atti-
tude towards risk in economic analysis. 
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  As Ménard 2005, p. 284, states: ―[T]ransactions develop in environments plagued with uncertainties. 
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in Arrow-Debreu type contracts, Knightian uncertainty cannot be discarded: significant decisions remain 
noncontractibles.‖ 
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y (»x) – would make it beneficial to both parties to renegotiate the contract and to substitute 
item A through item B, the latter one promising higher profits for both of them. Efforts to 
accomplish these changes result in costs as outlined in chapter 2.2.3, which are expected to 
increase as the stakes of this transaction increase. Different kinds of adjustments can be 
achieved at varying difficulty. Quantity adjustments, for example, are easier to perform and 
more likely to be incentive-compatible, compared to price adjustments.
78
 
Another factor that aggravates the given scenario and also opens the door to a set of new, 
bargaining power related issues arises when one or both sides make relation-specific in-
vestments. Such investments yield a higher return in this specific relationship than in their 
second best use.
79
 In other words, the amount of non-marketable, transaction specific ex-
penses is crucial. These can be accrued through investments in special-purpose plants as 
well as in transaction specific skills of the workforce.
80
 The degree of specificity is ex-
pressed in the quasi-rent as illustrated in Figure 3.
81
  
 
Figure 3: Quasi Rent 
Source: Own illustration, based on Pies 2001, p. 109. 
 
There may be a large number of potential cooperation partners in the pre-contract stage t1, 
but this can radically change into a unilateral or bilateral monopoly after such investments 
were made. This is especially true, if the second best payoff in t2 is less than it would be, if 
                                                 
78
  Cf. Williamson 1979, p. 251, and Williamson 1985, p. 76. 
79
  Cf. Furubotn and Richter 2005, p. 568. 
80
  Cf. Williamson 1979, pp. 239-241. 
81
  According to Rubin 2005, p. 213, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978 have introduced the term quasi-
rents. Also see Holmstrom and Roberts 1998, pp. 76-77. As Homann and Suchanek 2005, pp. 137-138, 
point out, specific investments are very common, as basically all assets that help to utilize productivity 
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the investment had never been made.
82
 Such a fundamental transformation changes the 
bargaining power in ex-post haggling, as the termination of the relationship would seriously 
affect the payoff of the investing party.
83
 
The institutional framework, e.g. courts enforcing a contract based on existing law, cannot 
necessarily eliminate this threat. Real-world examples illustrate that the fines pronounced 
by courts sometimes fail to have the intended effect, i.e. the fines do not sufficiently change 
the payoffs to make cooperation a dominating strategy.
84
 Furthermore, it is frequently im-
possible for a third party to assess the efforts made by an actor or to appreciate behavior that 
has not been outlined in detail, but could be assumed to be in accordance with the original 
intent of the contract.
85
 
A situation in which a party shows opportunistic behavior and takes advantage of the other 
side‘s dependency due to relation-specific investments, and tries to appropriate the quasi-
rent is called hold-up.
86
 As soon as an actor has identified such a situation, there is a strong 
incentive to pursue this exploitative strategy.
87
 Firms are generally not able to avert the 
hold-up through ex ante contracting, as this is too costly and does not create value.
88
 
Two problems arise: Firstly, ex ante investment decisions are affected, if quasi-rents can not 
be secured, thus, preventing potential socially beneficial transactions. Secondly, ex post 
adaptation performance is diminished as renegotiation is costly, which reduces efficiency, if 
over time adaptations are required. Besides the allocation of rents, from a societal point of 
view this also has negative effects on the aggregated value of the trading relationship.
89
 
2.3.4.2 Specificity, Uncertainty, and Frequency 
It can be summarized that there are various contractual and organizational hazards, trigger-
ing transaction costs, resulting in the negative consequences just mentioned, all of which 
can be traced back to the focal unit of analysis, the transaction.
90
 Three, with regard to these 
issues, critical dimensions of transactions can be identified. Firstly, and most important, 
                                                 
82
  This worst case scenario is sometimes attributed with the term brisance, cf. Homann and Suchanek 
2005, p. 300. 
83
  Cf. Williamson 1985, pp. 61-63. Anderson and Gatignon 2005, pp. 410-411, point out that ―there is a 
tendency (…) as though all investments generate durable utility. But an investment is a commitment of 
resources. (…) Indeed, it could create a lasting disadvantage.‖ 
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  Gregor 2007, n.p., reports incidents in the New York housing markets where tenants frequently over-
stayed their rental period, thus hindering a successive tenant to move in. Although clearly a breach of 
contract, the predictable legal consequences were not sufficient to prevent this. Goldberg 2005 covers 
the complex relationship between private ordering and law, also touching the very issues mentioned in 
this chapter. 
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  Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 335. 
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  Cf. Becker 1997, p. 44. 
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  Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 321. 
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  Cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 138. 
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  Cf. Joskow 2005, pp. 321-326. 
90
  Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 320. 
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specificity of investments. Secondly, uncertainties and disturbances to which maladapta-
tions can accrue. Thirdly, the frequency of the transactions.
91
 
Specific investments have already been elaborated above and are considered as the most 
important dimension.
92
 The most common forms of specificity are site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated assets, and intangible or brand name 
assets.
93
 Uncertainty and disturbances which trigger ex post adaptation can be outcomes of 
actors‘ behavior, organizational deficiencies, inadequate institutions or simply the state of 
nature.
94
 In all cases significant costs can occur, although these vary by the type of adapta-
tions which are required.
95
 Frequency is the factor which is hardest to assess, and the only 
one of the three that is negatively related to transaction costs.
96
 It is assumed that ―[the] cost 
of specialized governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a re-
curring kind.‖97 The reason for this is that the fixed costs, which accrue to form a non-
market governance system, can be spread out more widely.
98
 Consequently, it matters most-
ly on the buyer side of the relationship.
99
 
Rational actors, knowing about the problems as well as the critical parameters, economize 
on the total (transaction) costs of the relationship.
100
 Since the public institutional setting 
frequently is not sufficient to successfully entertain complex relationships, private ordering 
through sensitive choice of contract law and governance structure becomes paramount.
101
 
2.3.4.3 Facing the Problem: Private Ordering – Market, Hierarchy, or Hybrid 
There is a large range of different options on how to organize an economic relationship, 
with spot-markets and hierarchies (as in a firm) presenting the polar points. In-between lays 
a continuum of different hybrid forms, including long term contracts, joint ventures or hold-
                                                 
91
  Cf. Williamson 2005b, p. 47. The following will mainly focus on specificity of investments, as those 
have repeatedly been pointed out as the most crucial of all issues; cf. Ménard 2005, p. 285. 
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  Cf. Williamson 1985, p. 52 and p. 56. It has to be noted that recent research substantiates this stream of 
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mar 2006, p. 519. 
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  See Joskow 2005, pp. 327-328, for more details on different types of asset specificity. 
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  Cf. Williamson 1985, p. 56-59. 
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  So are quantity adjustments easier to facilitate than changes in prices; for example problems may arise 
when prices are tagged to general economic conditions, but local circumstances differ significantly; cf. 
Williamson 1979, pp. 251-252. 
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  Cf. Williamson 1985, p. 285. 
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  Williamson 1985, p. 60. 
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  Cf. Holmstrom and Roberts 1998, p. 76. 
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  Cf. Williamson 1985, p. 72. 
100
 Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 321. This, of course, is a simplification of the problem. For a final assessment both, 
production and transaction costs have to be considered, taking into account effects like economies of 
scale; cf. Williamson 1985, p. 61. The analytical framework to do this is too complex for a paper of this 
kind. Thus, only the transaction cost economizing aspect is looked at in the following. 
101
 Cf. Goldberg 2005, pp. 491-492, and Furubotn and Richter 2005, pp. 175-178 and pp. 564-565. 
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ing companies.
102
 Each of the three generic forms has its own characteristics with regard to 
the categories incentive intensity, administrative controls, contract law regime as summa-
rized in Table 1.
103
 
Governance Structures Governance Attributes 
 Incentive 
Intensity 
Administrative 
Control 
Contract Law 
Regime 
Spot Market ++ 0 ++ 
Hybrid + + + 
Hierarchy 0 ++ 0 
Table 2: Governance Structures 
Source: Williamson 2004, p. 926. 
 
These features, as outlined in the following paragraphs, determine the transaction costs that 
each type accrues for transactions that differ with regard to specificity of investments, dis-
turbances and frequency. Following the above elaborations that start with the prisoners‘ 
dilemma situation, it is obvious that a decision for supporting the relationship through con-
tractual modes of governance can help both sides to realize gains. The question that remains 
is under what circumstances which mode of governance is the most efficient choice.
104
 In 
his paper ―Comparative Economic Organizations: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Al-
ternatives‖ Williamson 1991 provides a framework for this, which has been more and more 
elaborated in the years thereafter. The following paragraphs briefly introduce the three ge-
neric modes of governance – market, hierarchy, and hybrid – illustrating their characteris-
tics.  
In this context, market is explicitly understood as a mode of organizing transactions.
105
 A 
purist spot market is a place of anonymous exchange between interchangeable individu-
als.
106
 Incentives are high-powered, especially since not only all chances, but also all the 
risks of an investment are completely with the actor. There is no supporting bureaucracy 
and the contractual framework is legalistic in a sense that no special measures that go 
beyond the public institutions and contract law regime are taken.
107
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 Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 320. 
103
 Cf. Williamson 2005b, p. 48. 
104
 Cf. Williamson 2005b, p. 48. 
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 This is in contrast to market as a set of arrangements which characterizes a market economy, cf. Ménard 
2005, p. 302. 
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 Cf. Joskow 2005, p. 320. 
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 Cf. Williamson 2005b, pp. 48-51. 
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All this makes the market the most cost-efficient form of governance for transactions that 
comprise goods of no or very little specific investment. But whenever these are high, trans-
action costs rise fast and can easily offset the savings made by not having to pay for bureau-
cratic structures. 
Some caveats apply, since no market is the same. Markets are shaped through the respective 
institutional environment and enforcement mechanisms, all of which not only can be 
changed to a certain degree by the actors themselves, but also result in different transaction 
costs.
108
 
The other pole of the spectrum is a hierarchy as it exists in a completely integrated firm. 
Although a firm can be interpreted as nothing else but a nexus of contracts, there are some 
features that differentiate it from other forms of governance.
109
 On the one side, incentives 
are very low-powered, as for example employees are fairly insulated by a fixed salary.
110
 
This is compensated by administrative support in form of a significant bureaucracy. Disa-
greements are solved within the company, fiat being the ultimate court of appeal.
 111
 
Since disputes are easier to solve, if one party has formal control over both sides of the 
transaction, which is given in a hierarchy (firm) rather than in a market relationship, a hie-
rarchy works relatively best in circumstances that provoke hazards like hold-up situations. 
For example, triggered by high specific investments.
112
 Nonetheless, individuals within an 
organization – no matter how hierarchical – remain driven by their self-interest.113 This 
drives up the costs of bureaucracy, which also has to compensate for low-powered incen-
tives. The costs for running a hierarchy are governance costs, representing a special type of 
transaction costs.
114
 Summarizing, internal organization attenuates incentives to behave 
opportunistically, supports efficient auditing, and is a preferred option for dispute settle-
ment.
115
 
As already mentioned earlier, spot market and hierarchy are polar cases. There is a wide 
array of hybrids between these two extremes.
116
 By definition this also means that the go-
vernance attributes are also somehow in the middle. There are some incentives, but not as 
extreme as in a pure market, and there is a bureaucracy working in the background. Most 
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 Cf. Ménard 2005, pp. 304-305. 
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 Cf. Homann and Suchanek 2005, p. 286 and p. 292. 
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important is the role of the contracts that are applied. Contracts are used as a framework that 
allows for certain adaptations without extensive renegotiations.
117
 
The results are again located between a pure market and a real hierarchy. This makes hybrid 
forms cost efficient for transactions that are on the one side too specific to be handled over a 
spot market, but on the other side are not that specific as that they would allow for the ex-
pensive bureaucracy of a hierarchical organization.
118
 
Because hybrids are so diverse it is still hard to grasp what hybrids really look like. To shed 
more light into this, by no means trivial question, some of the many aspects Ménard 2005 
references are illustrated at this point.
119
 One of the main features is relational contracting 
between the actors. Such contracts are incomplete and provide a basic and homogenous 
framework for the relationship. This requires some kind of governance entity that can fill 
the open ended parts of the contract, monitors the partner and solves conflicts. The need for 
this (central) governance function, together with the need for coordination provides part of 
the reason why specific investments in human capital play such an important role. Careful 
selection of partners who benefit from specific investments as well as skills in assessing 
performance are paramount. The actual setup of such a governing entity can range from 
loose, trust based structures over slightly more dense networks to a designated internal 
leader who has to carefully balance decision power and symmetry of the relationship. The 
extreme would be an external quasi-autonomous body which shares attitudes of a hierarchy. 
The degree to which the hybrid is exposed to uncertainty and to the related necessity for 
adaptation play an important role in the final design. If these are high, or inputs, outputs or 
transformation processes are difficult to monitor, there is a stronger need for decisive go-
vernance than otherwise. To smooth the relationship and to take pressure from the contract 
itself annexes are frequently used, for example, to carve out quality issues and allow for 
easier adaptation. Multilateral agreements can support governance, as they allow for ben-
chmarking. Peer review is another tool that has proven successful under these circums-
tances. All this highlights the delicate role of competition in such a context. Although the 
partners cooperate in certain respects, there still is room for competitive behavior in other 
areas. Furthermore, an overall very competitive market can present a reason for the emer-
gence of hybrids to enhance the players‘ chances of survival by decreasing uncertainties and 
pooling resources as well as by serving as some kind of buffer.
120
 However, the viability of 
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a hybrid structure is assumed to be relatively low when frequent disturbances occur as adap-
tation decisions have to be made by both partners, rather than unilaterally like in a market or 
through fiat.
121
 
This presentation hardly does justice to the diversity and potential of hybrids, but hopefully 
provides a sufficient basis for the following applications. 
2.3.5 Concluding Assessment 
Completing the elaboration on transaction cost theory in the preceding chapter Figure 4 
brings the three different modes of governance in relation to each other, exemplifying for 
the parameter specificity. 
 
Figure 4: Transaction Costs and Asset Specifity 
Source: Own illustration, based on Williamson 2005b, pp. 49. 
 
For all forms of governance higher specificity k means higher transaction costs. However, a 
hierarchy H handles the increase better than a hybrid X, which in this respect still performs 
better than the market M. In technical terms this means that M(0) < X (0) < H (0) and M‘(k) 
> X‘(k) > H‘(k). The bold line indicates the efficient contractual mode.122 Obviously, the 
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transitions points k1 and k2 are not as clear cut as might be suggested by the graph, which is 
a schematic presentation. 
Contrasting principal-agent theory and transaction cost theory another difference can now 
be seen: Whereas the first, ex ante incentive oriented approach purely changes payoff rights, 
the second, ex post governance driven approach allocates decision rights.
123
 
Although this paper combines principal-agent and transaction cost theory considerations, 
certain caveats remain. Probably most striking is the focus on costs. Any revenue conse-
quences and production-cost effects are omitted in these models.
124
 Other factors that can 
influence ownership patterns are difficulties in transferring knowledge or concerns for 
common assets, to name only two.
125
 For the sake of consistency in the theory-based argu-
mentation and taking into account the limited scope of this paper these limitations are here-
by acknowledged but cannot be completely resolved.
126
 
2.4 Brief Summary of Theory 
This chapter set out to provide economic theory that could give insight into two different, 
but nonetheless closely related areas. After outlining required basics of New Institutional 
Economics this was approached by looking at two streams of contract theory. The first part 
– looking into the incentive structure of economic actors and its impact on their interaction 
– was covered by principal-agent theory. Transaction cost theory served for the second part, 
i.e. investigating different modes of structuring economic relationships. 
Although these two theories, even if taken together, still omit some potentially relevant as-
pects of the analysis, the most crucial points are covered.
127
 Thus, it seems reasonable to 
proceed to have a closer look at the health care sector, in which the key relationship of this 
investigation, the relationship between insurer and provider, is nested. 
3 The Health Care Sector 
3.1 Economics and Health Care 
Health care and economics have a strained relationship that yet has to live up to its great 
potential. Since Kenneth Arrow’s ―Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
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Care‖ touched formerly foreign ground in 1963, much progress has been made.128 Howev-
er, a countless number of misunderstandings and misconceptions on both sides have caused 
irritation and probably prevented some achievable positive outcomes.
129
 This chapter aims 
to deliver a succinct characterization of parts of the health care sector relevant to avoid 
some of these hurdles.
130
 After outlining the normative framework of health care and illu-
strating some of the unique features of healthcare goods and services, the objectives and 
interests of the different actors as well as their relationships are elaborated on. Whenever 
referenced in this chapter, health systems are considered in abstract terms, not related to any 
specific incarnation like a social health insurance based system or a National Health Service 
approach. 
3.2 Societal Norms 
3.2.1 Basic Health Care for Everybody 
Societal norms define certain goals of a health care system. For example, across most coun-
tries it is understood that medical care must not be denied if needed. This is reflected in the 
Hippocratic Oath and is adopted practice by many professional groups in the health sector. 
Sometimes this is referred to as a human right, sometimes more generally as a right for all 
people.
131
 However, the practical implications of this are much more complex and lead to 
quite different results across the world.
132
 Whereas the British government has accepted the 
duty to provide healthcare as a perfect obligation, and in Germany all citizens are legally 
enabled to obtain health insurance, the U.S. not only struggles to deliver this ethical 
mandate but also fails to agree on such a notion on a societal level.
133
 
This paper adopts the view of international groups like the Tavistock Group defining health 
care as a right, but acknowledging that it has to be balanced against scarcity of resources, 
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which makes a provision of all available services for everybody impossible. The logical 
result is to guarantee access to basic medical care for all people.
134
 
To operationalize this abstract concept of basic medical care the three parameters access, 
quality and costs are looked at in more detail. Taken as proxies for societal norms these 
factors allow assessing the desirability of different forms of organizing the insurer-provider 
relationship; at a later stage of this paper the outcomes of various models are compared to 
these proxies.
135
  
3.2.2 Access 
A plethora of definitions are available for the term access. This may be a good indicator for 
the importance of the phrase or the frequency of its use, but is not very helpful. In the fol-
lowing section, access is therefore understood as a combination of availability, accessibility, 
and affordability.
136
 
Availability contrasts the type and volume of services required by patients with what is be-
ing provided, especially with regard to facilities and human resources. The geographic di-
mension is added through accessibility, highlighting the fact that distance can present a sig-
nificant barrier to care, e.g. through time restraints or costs of transportation.
137
 Finally, 
affordability compares the financial resources of consumers with the costs of health care, 
i.e. prices charged by providers, co-payments and insurance premiums. Affordability is a 
subjective concept and threshold levels vary considerably in literature as well as in policy 
implementation. The appropriate share of health expenses of general income is obviously 
lower for people with extremely low incomes as other basic needs have to be covered 
too.
138
 The patients‘ capability of identifying and obtaining affordable goods and services is 
also relevant for this aspect.
139
 
3.2.3 Costs 
Affordability on an individual level is closely related to costs. If costs are high, fewer indi-
viduals are able to afford health care without assistance. Given society‘s ethical mandate to 
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ensure that everybody has access to basic health care, an increase in people who cannot 
afford health care results in a higher burden on others, who have to take on this responsibili-
ty. 
There are several ways this social responsibility is handled. One option is through state sub-
sidies which come from tax revenues. In a globalized economic world high taxes can 
present a competitive disadvantage, thus, again putting wages under pressure and jeopardiz-
ing individuals‘ chances to buy health services by themselves. In social health insurance 
schemes with contributions co-sponsored by employers, there is a similar effect.
140
 
Either way, high costs in health care have mainly two closely related disadvantages: They 
increase the amount of subsidy required to assure health care also the poor and they threaten 
the ability of people who are currently financially independent to afford health care in the 
future.
141
 
This cost-consciousness must not be confused with limiting any expansion of health related 
expenditure. In this regard the health industry is an industry as any other one: it creates jobs, 
contributes to overall wealth and fuels many related industries. Thus, the health sector can 
and must also be considered as a growing market that also offers additional benefits.
142
  
Concluding this section it can be stated that besides guaranteeing access, society also has a 
strong interest in minimizing costs for a given level of quality.
143
 This conclusion may ap-
pear strange at first glance. However, two things have to be taken into account: Firstly, ap-
plying economic efficiency considerations, either input or output must be held fixed while 
the other factor is optimized.
144
 If the aim is to ensure access to basic health care for every-
body, the latter applies. Secondly, just as access requires the availability of health services, 
quality encompasses access. The next chapter helps to explain this. 
3.2.4 Quality 
Quality links in with the term basic health care for everybody. What services are required to 
provide sufficient health care and what is the appropriate service level? This section focuses 
on the second aspect and more specifically on the third of Donabedian’s quality dimen-
sions, which are structure, process and outcome.
145
 For the purpose of this paper quality is 
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defined as outcome that is in the best interest of patients. This is intentionally vague and 
puts the focus on the goal of achieving quality rather than on the question of defining quali-
ty in detail.
146
 
Bad quality of health care not only harms the individual, it also harms society as it leads to 
higher direct and indirect costs. This is illustrated by a recent, large scale study which sug-
gests that in the U.S. each year about 9.3 billion USD in excess charges and 32,591 attribut-
able deaths occur in the course of medical errors during hospitalization.
147
 This, however, 
only accounts for costs coming from obvious medical mistakes and not for medical, psycho-
logical and financial harm caused in more subtle ways. For example, when better and 
cheaper treatment options or disease management programs are not offered due to skewed 
reimbursement incentives or lack of knowledge, this is lower quality care.
148
 
Overall, it is fair to say that quality represents a key dimension that any health system has to 
be measured by. And the concern is even greater, as quality is as relevant to everybody as it 
is difficult to assess. The following chapter provides some insight into this issue. 
3.3 Characteristics 
3.3.1 Identifying Relevant Parameters 
This outline of the general goals of a health care system, like access, costs, and quality, will 
serve as an external benchmark for the discussion of different arrangements. The next sec-
tion will define the characteristics of the goods and services involved in meeting these goals 
by identifying relevant parameters of health services and characterizing them. 
In most cases, when health care services are characterized, they are looked at from a market 
failure or welfare economic perspective. Relevant issues in this context are: increasing 
economies of scale, public good characteristics, external effects or market transparency and 
consumer sovereignty problems.
149
 However, looking at economic theory as developed in 
chapter 2.3, some factors play a more important role than others. These are in particular 
measurability and risk with regard to principal-agent theory and specificity of investments, 
                                                 
146
 The number of definitions available for quality is immense. E.g., the Institute of Medicine 2001, p. 232, 
defines quality as ―the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the like-
lihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge‖; another de-
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time in the right way to achieve the best possible results; cf. AHRQ 2005, p. 3. 
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on the same topic. The Institute of Medicine 1999 report ―To Err Is Human‖ is considered as 
groundbreaking with regard to identifying these problems. However, surprisingly little has changed since 
then as Millenson 2003, pp. 103-112, illustrates.  
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 Cf. Urbina 2006, n.p. 
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 Cf. Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 173-175. 
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disturbances and frequency of interactions with regard to transaction cost theory.
150
 Whe-
reas measurability and risk are mainly (but not exclusively) related to health care services 
and goods, the latter three are nested in the relationship between different players. This dis-
tinction is reflected in the focus of the following two chapters. 
3.3.2 Health Care Services 
3.3.2.1 Measurability and Information Asymmetry 
Looking at health care services measurability is a central issue. The title of this section pairs 
it up with information asymmetry. This is reasonable as the need for evaluation – hence 
measurement – increases with the degree to which information is unequally distributed. 
Obviously, different types of services have different degrees of measurability. For example, 
it is relatively easy to determine the number of laboratory tests performed in a facility, but it 
is much more complicated to assess the quality of treatment over a full period of illness. 
Regulatory measures like licensing can reduce some of the uncertainty but cannot eliminate 
it.
151
 
An additional layer of complexity is added from the consumers‘ viewpoint as there is no 
possibility to sample and test the quality in advance, as the services are frequently required 
on an ad hoc basis. In case of diagnostic services the requested good is information. It is ex 
ante impossible to evaluate information as this would require that the information is already 
available before being diagnosed. When services finally are delivered, the uno-actu prin-
ciple applies, which means that production and consumption occur at the same time, which 
again disallows for comparing different options.
152
 Thus, to sum it up, healthcare is an ex-
perience good.
153
 Even ex post it remains exceptionally difficult to assess the quality of 
services as many confounding variables and factors influence the final result and make it 
difficult to account for causality between treatment and result; two such factors are for ex-
ample patient compliance or biological processes. Thus, quality of services is hardly verifi-
able ex ante as well as ex post.
154
 Although most literature in this context refers to consum-
ers, these characteristics also challenge insurers. 
One way to eliminate some of these measurability and information issues is to look at input 
factors like the extent a provider keeps up with cutting edge developments in her field, for 
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example by attending courses and obtaining certifications.
155
 However, it remains very dif-
ficult to validate the everyday efforts a provider puts into increasing her knowledge and 
providing quality care to her patients. Consequently, failing quality can hardly be proven 
through external authorities like a court, which makes it very difficult to integrate quality as 
a parameter into a reimbursement contract.
156
 
So it is difficult to detect substandard quality. Furthermore, if services are delivered under 
standard market procedures, which means that a service is rendered for a fee, supplier-
induced demand can be observed. In such a case output as well as prices are likely to rise. If 
not controlled, the result could be poor quality and expensive services.
157
 
This illustrates that measurability of health care services is relatively low, whereas informa-
tion asymmetry remains high. Both, however, are crucial factors in determining the struc-
ture of the insurer-provider relationship as they directly impact on societal goals like quality 
as defined in chapter 3.2. 
3.3.2.2 Risks Related to Health and Health Care Services 
Besides the health risk that goes along with low quality of care or informational bias there 
are characteristics of health and health care services in general that pose an array of differ-
ent risks, most importantly financial ones. Not only consumers, but also providers and in-
surers have to face those. 
Health hazards are generally difficult to predict on an individual level. Certain, for example 
genetic, preexisting conditions may raise the probability of some diseases. However, on a 
large scale the likelihood for a particular individual to suffer from one or another disease is 
almost impossible to determine. Reliable predictions can usually only be made on a higher 
level that groups together a larger number of people. This directly impacts the demand 
structure for health care services. There are some needs like preventive care, regular check-
ups or even dental prosthesis that are required within time periods and at costs that can be 
predicted with a relatively high certainty. However, to a large degree demand is determined 
through episodes of acute illness. Consequently, demand is similar to a probability function. 
Consistent with these health care specific issues, as a general rule, risk is the easier to man-
age the better it can be spread out, be it over a number of individuals or of incidents. Thus, 
patients transfer their risk to insurance companies.
158
 
                                                 
155
 Cf. Institute of Medicine 2001, p. 211. 
156
 Cf. Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 397. 
157
 Cf. Evans 1973, pp. 163-166. 
158
 Cf. Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000, pp. 571-772. 
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Unpredictable episodes of illness do not only cause loss in quality of life or death. Risk also 
emerges from the significant financial consequences that are triggered by adverse health 
incidents. Besides the uncertain costs of treatment, which depending on the reimbursement 
system can impact providers as well as patients, also forgone income has to be considered 
on the patients‘ side. As the monetary loss can be substantial it is close to impossible for 
individuals to accrue adequate savings to insulate against potential monetary shocks.
159
 
Summarizing the risk characteristics, it can be stated that health related adverse events are 
not only threatening consumers medically, psychologically and financially, but they also 
can negatively impact providers, if reimbursement is inadequate. All this is closely related 
to the individual‘s capability to spread risk and to account for potential future events. 
3.3.3 Stakeholders in the Health Care sector 
3.3.3.1 Setting the Scene 
Before looking at the next set of characteristics it is necessary to look at the different stake-
holders in the health care sector. Only after having identified their specific interests and 
relationships, the above developed theory can be applied properly. Thus, the aim of this 
chapter is to set the scene for illustrating the relationships between the actors in a health 
care system by identifying them, defining their objective function and finally looking at 
their risk attitudes. For the purpose of the analysis a free market and a competitive envi-
ronment is assumed, in which actors‘ behavior is mainly driven by factors as outlined in 
chapter 2.2.2.2. 
The classic key players in a health care system are consumers, providers, third-party payers, 
and the regulator, which is the state. Although an indefinite list of other stakeholders sup-
plements them, these four perform the core functions.
160
 This means: The consumer de-
mands health care services in case of acute need or preventive and elective measures. Since 
the financial risk that goes along with illness is significant, some kind of risk pool is inter-
posed. Besides spreading the risk this pool has two functions: First, collecting money from 
the consumer and second ensuring provider payment, be it through direct reimbursement or 
patient indemnity plans. The provider delivers health care services and receives money from 
the risk pool and/or the consumer. The state, in this scenario is limited to perform regulatory 
duties, aiming at the goals outlined in chapter 3.2. Regulatory duties also include ensuring a 
free, competitive market, e.g. through applying antitrust legislation. 
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 Cf. Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000, p. 566, and Mossialos and Dixon 2002, p. 2. Other stakeholders like 
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Since the scope of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between insurer and provid-
er, at this stage one bold assumption is made to take consumers and state out of the equa-
tion. This assumption is that the insurer as well as the state are henceforth perfect agents of 
consumers.
161
 This reduces the problem to the relationship between insurer and provider, 
whose objective functions are elaborated on in the next chapter. 
3.3.3.2 Objective Functions 
Having already raised the issue of actors‘ goals, these can be made explicit in a more formal 
way.
162
 The provider‘s objective function aims to maximize her utility Up. Expected income 
P increases utility whereas direct costs C and indirect costs V diminish it.
163
 A quality of 
care component q is introduced and the effort e of the provider is taken into account. Thus, 
in a formal way, the provider‘s objective function can be stated as 
UP = E(P) – C(q, e) – V(q, e). (5) 
C is positively correlated to q and negatively to e, which means that the provision of a high-
er level of quality increases costs, but that through extra efforts the provider can contribute 
to cost savings too. The converse is true for indirect costs V. While the efforts e diminish 
the providers utility, for example through the time she has to put into these measures, a 
higher level of quality improves utility example. 
The insurer‘s utility function is positively influenced by the quality level q, but utility is 
reduced through the payment of income to the provider. This results in the insurer‘s objec-
tive function  
Ui = B(q) – E(P). (6) 
As equation (5) and (6) illustrate even such a basic form of modeling players‘ objective 
functions can highlight some potential conflicts of interest. Possible sources are, for exam-
ple, differing impact of q on their utility or the fact that efforts e are not reflected in the in-
surer‘s objective function.  
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 The assumption of a benevolent state is problematic but necessary. Weingast 2005, pp. 149-151, gives 
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3.3.3.3 Risk Attitudes 
According to the preceding chapter, due to the characteristics of health threats, individual 
consumers are highly vulnerable to risks. They have no capability of predicting or spreading 
risk very well and have only limited financial resources available. Although this commonly 
leads to a pooling of risks trough some kind of insurance, the setup of which can take vari-
ous forms, individuals themselves have to be considered as risk averse.
164
 
For the provider it is slightly easier to balance financial risk, which she might encounter 
through an insufficiently reimbursed treatment for a single patient as usually a large number 
of patients is seen. Even more so, the risk is minimal as long as all services provided are 
completely covered through patient or insurer payments. Depending on the reimbursement 
mechanism, however, there could be risks for the provider, either if certain types or thera-
pies are systematically under-funded and/or the provider serves a very specific high 
need/low reimbursement population. In the latter case a geographic lock-in effect is likely 
to make it difficult at least for smaller providers to pool the amount of risk presented by this 
population with more profitable patients.
165
 Financial risks for providers are also attributed 
to investments in expensive equipment, an aspect which will be covered more in-depth in 
chapter 3.3.4.2. It is noteworthy that a small independent physician‘s office is obviously 
much more limited in pursuing different ways to face these challenges than a large hospital 
system. The implications from this will be considered in the course of this paper and also 
lead to the conclusion that, whereas small providers are quite likely to be risk averse, larger 
providers‘ attitude towards risk can be characterized more as risk neutral.166 
With regard to the size of the risk pool insurance companies have the highest capability of 
dividing up the burden between a large number of consumers as well as providers. Consi-
dering this, insurers are risk neutral.
167
 
After having identified and characterized key stakeholders in the health sector in this chap-
ter, the following section investigates the relationships between the different actors based on 
the parameters developed so far. 
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3.3.4 Characteristics of Contractual Relationships 
3.3.4.1 Setting the Scene 
To characterize the relationship between insurer and provider, some basic aspects have to 
be considered. First of all, services rather than goods are purchased. This directly impacts 
the legal codes that apply, if somebody is sued for breach of contract, thus highlighting the 
important role of the institutional framework.
168
 Any health care market is subject to an 
overwhelming amount of regulation, which goes well beyond what is required for ―regular‖ 
businesses.
169
 Certain types of contracts are completely disallowed, for example those that 
would put patients at risk.
170
 These and other parameters of the institutional environment 
have to be considered, if potential contractual regimes are evaluated. 
A second point worth mentioning is the bilateral nature of the relationship. Although prima 
facie the insurer is a typical purchaser of services produced by a provider, the value chain to 
be considered is more complex. By entering into a contract with an insurer the provider 
potentially receives benefits like access to markets, reputation effects and knowledge trans-
fers.
171
 
Taking the analysis to the next level the following sections look at specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency, the parameters identified above to be essential defining the mode of organiz-
ing the insurer-provider relationship. 
3.3.4.2 Specificity 
To be able to assess the specificity of investments conducted it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the type of investment made. It is also important to restrict considerations 
only to investments which are linked to the specific contractual relationship. If, for example, 
this means a provider invests in highly expensive, narrow use equipment without any con-
nection at all to the relationship with an insurer (e.g. cosmetic surgery equipment) this may 
well produce sunk costs. These, however, are irrelevant for this analysis. 
Next the investments in sites, physical assets, human assets, dedicated assets and intangible 
or brand name assets will be considered. 
Locations and geography play an important role for providers as well as for insurers, but 
does this translate into site specificity? Providers need facilities to perform their services 
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close to where patients are.
172
 Although not any real estate is suitable to house provider ser-
vices, especially when organizations like hospitals are considered, there still remains the 
option to rent or to sell property for alternative use.
173
 For most insurers geography is im-
portant, as they have to be close to consumers, but there is no need for having sites in a spe-
cific geographic relation to providers. However, it is important for insurers to have access to 
providers, because if an insurer wants to cover consumers in certain areas but cannot offer 
access to services there, the insurance product is difficult to sell. Consequently, it seems 
likely that insurers want to contract providers in certain areas. Nonetheless, it remains un-
likely that this triggers site specific investments by any side. More importantly, although the 
investment may be site specific, it is not necessarily relation specific, as a provider can use 
the same facility to enter a relationship with another insurer, be it afterwards or even simul-
taneously. 
Physical assets are numerous and especially in medical care many of them are very specific 
(e.g., diagnostic equipment), but again their use is not limited to a specific insurer-provider 
relationship. This is even truer for the insurer side, which is not using any customized pro-
duction equipment at all. One potential trigger for relation-specific investments in physical 
assets could be the communication interface between insurer and provider, for example, if 
specific hard- or software
174
 has to be purchased to transmit claims or similar data, which is 
not used by other players. A similar effect could be observed, when only few insurers re-
quire certain quality-related standards that are linked to physical assets. However, the value 
of the second use of equipment and tools is generally fairly high as it can be used outside of 
the specific relationship too.
175
 
Human assets seems to be a more likely candidate for specific investments as far as the in-
surer-provider relationship is concerned. On the provider side, training is required to enable 
utilization review, accreditation, network contracting and financial risk management. For 
example portfolio building of capitated and non-capitated services is directly dependent on 
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 Billi, Pai and Spahlinger 2007, p. 28, not only conclude that utilization of health care and burden of 
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the quality of contracts negotiated with insurers.
176
 On the insurer side, this set of problems 
is mirrored. One question for insurers in this context could be how much experience gained 
by a specific employee with regard to a specific provider helps in a way that cannot be re-
produced by data alone. To a certain extent personal relations also make it easier to facili-
tate such a relationship, especially when negotiations and bargaining plays an important 
role. This seems to be more likely when large providers are involved, for which more cus-
tomized contracts are elaborated. 
A provider is much more likely to be seen by a patient when the consumer‘s insurance cov-
ers the doctor visit. This means that having or not having a contractual relationship with a 
(not too small) insurance company can significantly affect the number of patients seeking 
treatment at this particular institution. Once such a contract is terminated, it is quite likely 
that the provider will have excess capacity from dedicated assets. Of course some of this 
capacity could be reduced quickly, but some of it is likely fixed. (Medical) services ob-
viously cannot be ―stored‖, which means that capacities are either used immediately or are 
essentially worthless.
177
 Thus, dedicated assets are particularly sensitive to volume and 
market share by which individual companies have the power to significantly manipulate 
demand.
178
 Premature contract termination of a large provider might also affect the insur-
ance companies‘ ability to provide specific services in a certain area, this however is not 
related to dedicated assets. 
As a last type of assets intangible or brand name assets have to be considered. If providers 
and insurers work in a competitive environment, marketing and branding play an increa-
singly important role. Depending on the regulatory environment this varies from market to 
market and is not necessarily determined by characteristics of these services. In certain 
markets a high use of these measures can be observed.
179
 This can be critical if an insurance 
company advertises with a provider‘s services as both can take harm, for example, if the 
other side receives negative media coverage due to medical negligence or insufficient cov-
erage. On the other hand, under a franchise system, which allows use of a certain brand 
name, all investments of the provider in reputation of this brand name are lost, if the license 
is withdrawn.
180
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Although it is difficult to quantify the specificity of investments in the insurer-provider rela-
tionship, it seems to be a moderate threat. However, there are some relation-specific in-
vestments, for example through specific hardware or software requirements, experienced 
human resources for provider specific monitoring and negotiating, or brand name related 
activities. 
3.3.4.3 Uncertainty 
The next parameter to be considered is uncertainty which might lead to disturbances of the 
insurer-provider relationship, requiring adaptation, monitoring or renegotiation. Roughly, 
potential disturbances can be differentiated in external and internal factors.
181
 After looking 
at these two aspects, the kind of adaptations that are required by different kinds of distur-
bances are briefly covered. 
Starting with the external factors, some examples, but by no means a conclusive list, are 
given. As the business under investigation is related to health, changes in the demand for 
health services triggered by illnesses or diseases are a likely factor to require adjustments in 
the relationship; for example, if a certain volume of a specific service has been contracted 
and the actual demand, e.g. through an epidemic, exceeds this, renegotiations are required. 
The same could happen, if demand is surprisingly low. In the long term changes in demo-
graphy of clients or population also play a role. However, as these are long-term develop-
ments, it should be possible to account for them in the contract more easily than for more 
sporadic changes.
182
 
Other factors that can be changes in the regulatory environment include those related to 
quality requirements like minimum case numbers, reimbursement restrictions or changes in 
the mandatory benefit catalog.
183
 Depending on contract period and legislature unpredicta-
bility, these factors could be cause for renegotiations. 
As health care is a field of permanent innovation, be it through pharmaceuticals or other-
wise, new treatment options frequently have to be considered with regard to their status in 
the insurers‘ formulary or benefit catalog.184 Conflicts can arise, if providers think that a 
certain innovation is necessary and beneficial, but insurers think otherwise. It is also possi-
ble that a procedure was covered and providers therefore had invested in expensive equip-
ment, when a cost-effective alternative was developed and insurers mandated the use of the 
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new option before the other equipment had paid off. Thus, innovation can cause uncertain-
ty, especially in fields where it is more common than in others. 
After external factors a number of internal uncertainties and disturbances must be investi-
gated. Internal uncertainties mainly emerge with regard to inputs and outputs as well as the 
transformation processes themselves and are directly linked to actors‘ behavior. Moral ha-
zard, as one peculiarity, has already been briefly mentioned. As outlined above the assess-
ment of quality of care – which embraces all aspects from input over transformation to out-
put and outcome – is difficult and costly, especially if proxies are regarded as second choice 
and ―true outcomes‖ are requested. This leaves a lot of potential for opportunistic behavior, 
for example in form of supplier induced demand.
185
 
Not only can providers trigger disturbances of the contractual relationship, but a common 
concern is delayed reimbursement of providers by insurers, or too restrictive handling of the 
benefit catalog, hindering providers to deliver the care they feel to be adequate.
186
 
So, what can be concluded? Back in 1963 Arrow states that uncertainty is a dominant fea-
ture in the health care market.
187
 Although new insights have alleviated this problem to a 
certain extent and the focus of this study is more on the intermediary product market, rather 
than the end-consumer market, uncertainty definitely remains an important characteristic of 
the insurer-provider relationship. 
3.3.4.4 Frequency 
According to literature, the parameter frequency is the most difficult one to assess with re-
gard to its impact. As frequency is focused purely on the buyer side, it seems to be primarily 
relevant from the insurers‘ viewpoint. Insurers typically have relations with a large number 
of providers, and therefore should be able to spread the costs of running a governance body 
quite easily. Again there may be some differences between the frequency of transactions 
with small providers compared to the number of big hospitals they cooperate with. The task, 
however, is pretty similar so that these economies of scale are likely to be levied. For an 
individual provider this is probably much more difficult because the number of insurance 
companies they cooperate with (on a significant volume) is likely to be fairly low. Thus, 
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from the provider side, it might be worth considering joining forces to balance this other-
wise quite asymmetric partnership.
188
 
This concludes the discussion of the specific characteristics of the insurer-provider relation-
ship. 
3.4 Brief Summary of Health Care Sector 
A clear understanding of the unique characteristics of the health care market is vital to en-
sure an appropriate application of economic theory. After setting out the normative frame-
work which was based on the principle of ―basic healthcare for everybody‖ and centered 
around the key areas of access, costs and quality, the key parameters of the preceding theory 
chapter were again summarized. Then the main part of this chapter was spent discussing 
these parameters, grouped into those applicable to health services and goods in general, 
those applicable to individual stakeholders and finally those associated with the contractual 
relationship between insurers and providers, and elaborating their specific characteristics in 
the health care market.  
4 Applying Theory to the Insurer-Provider Relationship 
4.1 Applicability of NIE to the Health Care Sector 
Now, as the next logic step, this chapter merges the theory-based concepts as outlined in 
chapter 2 with the specifications of the health care sector as presented in chapter 3 to make 
predictive statements about insurer and provider behavior, especially with regard to ensur-
ing incentive compatibility and identifying an efficient mode of contractual organization. 
Before starting of with this, some brief thoughts on the applicability of New Institutional 
Economics to the health care sector are presented. The sheer number of publications inves-
tigating principal-agent relationships within the health sector seems to indicate that this in-
deed is a sound approach to cover at least this specific aspect.
189
 This is supported by the 
almost ideal match of key factors in new institutional economic theory and health care poli-
tics, including information asymmetry and the informed patient or consumer, to name only 
two. The same is true for the insurer-provider relationship, as the insurer as purchaser of 
services gives entrepreneurial freedom to the provider to deliver these services on the insur-
er‘s behalf. This is consistent with common definitions of principal-agent relationships.190 
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Compared to this, the transaction cost component seems to be a more unlikely match. Most 
literature applies this heuristic in the context of manufacturing industries and refers to clas-
sic make-or-buy decisions and pure vertical integration.
191
 However, as Williamson puts it, 
―vertical integration turns out to be a paradigm‖.192 It can and has to be applied to contract-
ing more generally and helps to investigate relationships between all stakeholders in a busi-
ness environment, all of which are variations of a basic contractual schema. Thus, although 
the most common reference is to vertical integration, all kind of contractual relationships, 
be they backward, lateral or in any other dimension, can be adequately analyzed through 
tools provided by New Institutional Economics.
193
 Furthermore, the focus on identifying 
and making explicit strategic hazards that emerge in small number exchange relationships 
(for example in concentrated markets) proves very useful as the course of this paper will 
show.
194
 Gick 1999 provides an interesting example that transaction cost economics can be 
applied to the service sector to analyze questions of vertical integration. 
Before moving on, one word on transactions, as they play such a central role in this paper. It 
should be understood that a transaction in the insurer-provider relationship is not necessarily 
restricted to cover only one patient treatment episode. This is one option, however, not the 
only one. A transaction can also embrace a definite or even indefinite number of treatment 
episodes. The extent to which these are bundled or limited is a discretionary aspect of the 
contractual relationship between the two sides. 
4.2 The Principal-Agent Aspect 
4.2.1 Tackling Measurability Issues through Incentive Compatible Pay 
This chapter makes use of principal-agent theory, as outlined in chapter 2.3.2. The goal of 
this undertaking is to identify an efficient configuration of the provider-insurer relationship 
that allows compatible ex ante incentives with regard to the two key aspects identified 
above: measurement and information asymmetry problems as well as players‘ risk attitudes. 
Considering the high measurement costs and significant information asymmetries that result 
from the characteristics of health and health care services, moral hazard phenomena are 
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very likely.
195
 This makes ex ante alignment of incentives favorable from an efficiency 
viewpoint. 
The most common approach is to work on players‘ payoffs through the reimbursement sys-
tem. To do this Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005 present an approach which will be used 
in the following.
196
 They assume that neither effort nor quality is completely observable in 
this model, which means that these aspects cannot explicitly be included in a contract which 
could be enforced by a court.
197
 
In the original stylized model without a trade-off between quality and cost in chapter 
2.3.2.3, the efficient reimbursement mechanism was to leave all financial risk with the 
agent. But the issue of risk premiums indicates the potential need for amendments to 
achieve an efficient solution. To see how this plays out for a provider, who is assumed to 
have an interest in providing quality care and has an objective function as presented in 
chapter 3.3.3.2, the problem is now modeled with a twofold payment method. Only an ab-
ridged derivation is given at this point.
198
 
Building on the provider‘s objective function, the provider’s payment function additionally 
includes the variables G, which represents a basic residual component, and γ, which is the 
share of costs C paid for by the insurer. 
Up = G – (1 – γ)C(q, e) – V(q, e). (7) 
The provider maximizes her utility by applying first order conditions, thereby balancing 
marginal benefits and costs. The cost-sharing component γ is an exogenous factor in this 
equation. Thus, the reservation utility ū of the provider presents a constraint which leads to 
the condition 
G – (1 – γ) C(q*(γ), e*(γ)) – V(q*(γ), e*(γ)) ≥ ū. (8) 
The corresponding utility function for the insurer is 
Ui = B(q(γ)) – γC(q*(γ), e*(γ)) – G, (9) 
in which B represents the insurer‘s benefits from the quality level q provided. Solving (8) 
for G and inserting it into (9) the derivation by γ – after further transformation assuming 
utility maximizing behavior by the provider – results in 
dUi/dγ = dB/dq*dq/dγ – γ*dC/dq*dq/dγ - γ*dC/de*de/dγ. (10) 
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 This is based on the characteristics of health and health care services in chapter 3.3.2. 
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 Cf. Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, pp. 397-404, which is similar to the model used by Chalkley and 
Malcomson 2000. 
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 Cf. Chalkley and Malcomson 2000, p. 853. ―It has to be expected that in practice neither level of quality 
nor success of treatment can be sufficiently assessed. Thus, it is unlikely that contracts which refer to 
these measures will prevail.‖ Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 400, own translation. 
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 See Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 402, for a full specification of the model and all calculation 
steps. 
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If equaling zero, equation (10) maximizes insurer utility. However, given the plausible hy-
pothesis that dq/dγ > 0 and de/dγ < 0, equation (10) produces a positive value for γ = 0. This 
means that outcomes are not optimal, if the provider has exclusive responsibility for costs, 
as this results in excessive quality losses. 
This is understandable, as the positive effects a provider enjoys for the reduction of costs C 
through her residual income G are partly set off by the costs V she accrues through the ef-
forts e she has to put in to achieve this. However, these efforts are not reflected in the insur-
er‘s objective function, which thus benefits disproportionately by an increase of quality. To 
achieve the overall efficient result by capturing at least some of these positive externalities, 
a part of the provider‘s costs has to be shared by the insurer. Consequently, the insurer ben-
efits from a cost sharing arrangement γ > 0, which nonetheless presents only a second best 
solution as a cost-quality trade-off has to be balanced (de/dγ < 0 !).199 
4.2.2 Risk Attitudes, Differentiations and Caveats 
These conclusions are true for any type of provider with the objective function outlined 
above. However, looking now at the second criterion, the providers‘ risk attitudes, and 
maintaining the assumption that efforts are not observable, small and large providers have 
to be treated differently. 
As the first ones have a much smaller capability of handling risk than the second ones and 
are therefore risk averse, they demand a much higher risk premium. This premium presents 
a trade-off similar to the one described above; a higher risk premium or higher cost sharing 
diminishes incentives to work cost-effectively and consequently reduce efficiency. Al-
though this is only a second best solution, it is optimal for the insurer to lower the risk pre-
mium by bearing a certain share of costs.
200
 
For larger providers like unified physician groups, hospitals or even big hospital systems, 
this presents a smaller problem. As risk premiums are low, financial risk can be with the 
provider to a larger degree. In such a case a prospective payment system, which leaves all 
financial risk with the provider, yields the best outcomes and presents a first best solu-
tion.
201
 
The aim of this chapter was to identify a configuration of the insurer-provider relationship 
that achieves incentive compatibility in an efficient manner, taking into account measurabil-
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 Cf. Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2005, p. 387. Selder 2005, pp. 907-930, elaborates a reimbursement 
model taking into account patients‘ ex post moral hazard. A review of current literature on this topic is 
included. 
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ity and information asymmetry issues. As the strict conditions for the basic example in 
chapter 2.3.2.3 are not met in the health sector, a complete transfer of financial risk to the 
provider is not optimal. Depending on the extent to which these conditions are absent, an 
increasing share of provider‘s costs has to be reimbursed by the insurer. With regard to in-
centive compatibility this results in a second best solution, as certain trade-offs remain un-
solved.
 
 
Some relevant issues that have not been covered might require further consideration, includ-
ing how the actual costs should be determined and which measures an insurer or the regula-
tor has at hand to influence and change some of the conditions mentioned above. Finally, 
aspects like the impact of quality on demand and the effects of adverse selection had to be 
omitted.
 202
 
4.3 Transaction Cost Aspect 
4.3.1 Comparison of Different Coordination Methods 
After having looked into incentive compatibility issues in the preceding chapter, this section 
tries to predict outcomes for different modes of organizing the insurer-provider relationship. 
To do so, the outcomes for each of the three generic modes are evaluated in the following 
order. Firstly, potential forms of implementing this organizational schema are considered. 
Secondly, incentive compatibility according to the reimbursement scheme detailed above is 
assessed. Thirdly, the section concludes with a relative estimate of transaction costs to vali-
date efficiency. 
All assessments are based on findings from chapter 2.3.4 on transaction cost theory and 
chapter 3.3, which elaborates the applicable characteristics for the health sector.
203
 
4.3.2 Coordination through Market 
The most common implementation of a (spot-)market-like transaction form might be a ver-
sion that gives more autonomy to the consumer: the patient picks a provider of her choice 
and the insurer reimburses the consumer.
204
 This is different from the assumptions made 
above, which state that the insurer purchases on behalf of the consumer. Such a setup is 
unlikely for several reasons. The time period of contracts would need to be short. Otherwise 
control measures would be needed, which would require additional bureaucracy, an option 
that is by definition not available in the coordination mode market. Furthermore, it is close 
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 ―Traditional indemnity products typically permit patients to have unrestricted choice of physicians, 
reimburse providers on a fee-for-service basis, and do not manage care except through utilization review 
(typically for in-patient care).‖ Reschovsky, Kemper and Tu 2000, p. 220. 
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to impossible that an insurer would contract with providers on an ad-hoc, on-demand basis 
for individual consumers, as the transaction costs for this would be immense. Bundling 
more consumers in such short term contracts is a logistic maze and is unlikely to be imple-
mented. The author is not aware that anything like this has ever been implemented or has 
even been considered. 
It is very difficult to achieve incentive compatibility in this mode. Incentives, especially on 
the provider side, are high powered and the means to control and influence are limited. To 
implement a reimbursement system as developed in chapter 4.2.1, a close understanding of 
the providers‘ cost structure is necessary. This is difficult to obtain, if relationships are only 
on a short term basis and change frequently. Especially with smaller providers the risk pre-
mium problem becomes relevant too. Without going into more detail, even these few as-
pects make pure market coordination under the aspect of incentive compatibility undesira-
ble. 
The judgment under the transaction cost aspect is similarly negative. Although specificity of 
investments is only moderate, the level of uncertainty, especially that caused by potential 
internal disturbances, is high. Further, due to the characteristics of services and goods, com-
plete contracts are not feasible. This combination causes a relatively high level of transac-
tion costs. The frequency parameter is irrelevant in this case, as it refers to the degree to 
which costs of a governance structure can be spread out over a number of transactions, a 
structure which does not exist in the market mode. 
4.3.3 Coordination through Hierarchy 
The preceding chapters on pure market coordination have shown that there is a need for 
some kind of governance structure. The organizational form of a hierarchy – or in more 
concrete terms, of a firm – provides this. In such a scenario, physicians would be employed 
by the insurer and hospitals would be an integral part of the company. Setups of this kind do 
exist in the form of health maintenance organizations, which are prevalent in certain parts of 
the U.S., especially in California (e.g. Kaiser).
205
 
In this scenario, incentives are very low-powered. It is unlikely that salary would be highly 
dependent on performance in these settings. Rather than relying on incentives, the tight con-
trol and monitoring tools of the bureaucracy would ensure provider behavior that is in the 
insurer‘s best interest. Incentive compatibility is achievable in this context, but problems 
may arise as incentives are extremely low and motivation can be difficult.
206
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Furthermore, the administrative costs of such a bureaucracy are high and flexibility is low. 
The advantage is that disputes arising from internal disturbances can be dealt with very effi-
ciently. The governing body which oversees the now unified partners is the final court of 
appeal and can decide through fiat in a timely manner what has to be done. As outlined 
above, an insurer has a high number of relationships. Consequently, costs for governance 
can be distributed over these. The question is, whether the advantages of applying fiat and 
spreading costs offset the relatively high costs of running the bureaucracy. As specificity is 
only moderate, this seems to be unlikely, especially when compared with the last generic 
coordination mode.
207
 
4.3.4 Coordination through Hybrid 
The last means of coordinating the insurer-provider relationship is the hybrid form. It is 
based on relational contracts and is backed up by some means of bureaucracy. Implementa-
tion can be facilitated through contracts which cover time periods that are longer than the 
ones facilitated through the pure market. These contracts can define certain adaptation pro-
cedures or allocate decision rights for situations that are not predictable ex ante. Who exact-
ly receives these rights is an open question, but it would be possible for the insurance com-
pany to designate a leader or establish a peer review board. The latter could handle any 
questions emerging from internal disturbances like quality problems. As contracts are rela-
tively difficult to amend, annexes are an option to carve out parts that require adaptations 
more likely than others. 
Such contracts are likely to allow the establishment of reimbursement methods as described 
in chapter 4.2.1. As the relationship between the two sides is of a longer duration and also 
closer due to certain joint bureaucracy features, it is easier to develop an understanding of 
the providers‘ cost structures. Incentives remain relatively high and undiluted, but can be 
aligned reasonably well. Certain trade-offs, for example with regard to smaller, risk averse 
providers, remain, but should not be of major concern. 
Speaking about provider reimbursement, specific investments into information technology 
are feasible with less risk. Insurers can invest in human resources to maintain excellent rela-
tionships with key providers. On the other side providers can be more easily convinced to 
maintain a certain level of dedicated resources as an unpredicted termination of the contract 
is less likely. Through the governance system in place internal disturbances and uncertain-
ties can be reduced to a minimum. Given the characteristics outlined in chapter 3.3.4, hybr-
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ids seem to be the preferable option as far as transaction costs are considered, especially 
with regard to ex post adaptation. 
4.4 Choice 
Based on above elaborations neither market nor hierarchy seem to be the ideal mode of or-
ganizing the insurer-provider relationship. The presence of (at least moderate) specific in-
vestments makes the market unfavorable, but the governance costs of a hierarchy do not 
seem to be justified either. The potential of a reimbursement scheme that enhances incen-
tive compatibility supports this, as it reduces the risk for internal disturbances. In conse-
quence, insurers are expected to choose a hybrid solution, most likely with an internal lead-
er located at the insurance, but with elements of peer arbitration. The reimbursement me-
thod has to be customized, as there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the trade-off between 
flat fee and cost sharing. 
Phrasing this in the words of the research hypothesis from chapter 1.2, health system insur-
ers efficiently coordinate their contractual relationships with providers by pursuing hybrid 
arrangements. They efficiently align interests and incentives through payment methods. 
The following chapter assesses how these arrangements impact the second part of the hypo-
thesis which refers to social goals. 
4.5 General Results Based on Expected Behavior of Insurers 
Considering the external criteria access – with the sub-categories availability, accessibility 
and affordability – costs and quality, these theory-based predictions can now be put to a first 
test.  
Availability is more likely to be guaranteed by a hybrid that benefits from stabilization by 
some governance structure as investments into dedicated assets are less risky. The cost-
sharing component of the reimbursement scheme contributes to this aspect as well. Both 
arguments are also beneficial with regard to site specific investments, for example in more 
remote areas, which helps to improve accessibility. The criterion affordability is more diffi-
cult to assess. It is not clear how far a general interest in low costs and prices carries with 
regard to low income and/or high risk populations. Facilitating subsidies and income redi-
stribution remains in the public domain. This directly leads to the point of cost control. Giv-
en that insurers are perfect agents of consumers, a hybrid structure enables them to control 
for costs as well as for quality. However, the question remains how knowledgeable insurers 
are to use their means to the best ends – and the efficiency of these ex post measures, espe-
cially with regard to assessing quality, has already been questioned above. Thus, for the 
quality aspect, a well designed, ex ante incentivizing payment system is paramount. If es-
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tablished, the effects on quality should be positive. The same applies with regard to costs. 
As efforts are very difficult to assess, ex ante alignment is necessary. 
The hybrid form seems to be especially beneficial when adaptation is required. The occur-
rence of such circumstances is very likely since maintaining a well balanced incentive pay 
system is a very delicate manner and, if ex ante alignment cannot be achieved for any rea-
son, ex post control measures have to be the second line of defense. Furthermore, the trans-
action cost efficient form of a hybrid affects quality and costs, but in a supportive manner. 
To summarize, the overall goal ―basic coverage for everybody‖ is best supported by a pay-
ment system that allows for limited cost sharing (adjusted to risk attitude and cost-quality 
trade-off) combined with a hybrid contractual mode. 
4.6 Brief Summary of Theory Application 
Chapter 4 aimed to apply theory as elaborated in chapter 2 to the health sector, more specif-
ically to the insurer-provider relationship, which was characterized in chapter 3. After en-
suring that the chosen economic theory is compatible with the research object, the principal-
agent aspect was elaborated. With regard to incentive compatibility only a second best solu-
tion could be achieved, as a cost-quality trade-off remains unsolved. Transaction cost theory 
shed some light into the insurer-provider relationship. The hybrid mode proved to be trans-
action cost efficient. Ex ante and ex post measures together support the overall societal goal 
to provide basic healthcare for everybody. 
5 Excursus: The U.S. Health System 
5.1 Entering the “Real” World 
So far this examination has relied heavily on economic theory. Such an approach is helpful 
to gain insight into, or to inspire solutions for problems. However, at some stage all theory 
must be tested with regard to its applicability to reality. The model‘s predictions as well as 
assumptions have to be judged carefully. In the context of this paper this means that the 
hypothesis from chapter 1.2 is either verified or falsified. 
There are different methods to test a hypothesis, one of which is a quantitative study. Due to 
resource and time constraints this was not feasible for this project, thus a more qualitative 
approach has been selected. The health care market of North Carolina has been chosen to 
serve as the object of a case study, to see if the preceding theory-based elaborations find 
some grounding in a real-world scenario. However, there is no such thing as a ―perfect 
marketplace‖ and the North Carolina health care market has unique characteristics that for-
bid oversimplification and limit the ability to generalize findings. 
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For this reason this chapter starts off with a basic characterization of the U.S. health system. 
Based on this, North Carolina is considered in more detail in chapter 6, laying the founda-
tions for an in-depth look into the organization of the insurer-provider relationship in this 
specific state. To have a better understanding of the meaning of country- or state-specific 
statistics, international comparisons are given where appropriate. 
 A reader who is familiar with the U.S. health system and its history may well skip this ex-
cursus. All others are advised to read these pages at least later on, before making final 
judgments about health care in the U.S. Although this chapter is not needed to be able to 
follow the course of the paper and does not provide a comprehensive elaboration that covers 
all relevant aspects, it is important to know at least some complementary aspects of the sta-
tus quo and key events in the past to appreciate the current system in a more balanced man-
ner. Thus, this excursus is merely intended to provide some incentives to encourage further 
reading. 
5.2 Country Background 
This section provides a first introduction into the U.S. health system, beginning with basic 
statistics on the country itself. About 300 million people live the United States of America 
in an area of 9,161,906 square kilometers.
208
 Thus, the U.S. population is 3.7 times larger 
than the German population and lives on a 26 times larger area.
209
 With regard to general 
health outcomes (life expectancy, DALY etc.) the U.S. achieves average results compared 
to its peer countries.
210
 Its GDP per capita put the U.S. in the top of the league, in front of 
other industrialized countries like the UK, Japan or Germany.
211
 
In 2004 the U.S. spent 15.3 % of its GDP on health, which was significantly more than, for 
example, Germany (10.6 %), the Netherlands (9.2 %) or the United Kingdom (8.1%). This 
gap becomes even more apparent when total health expenditure in USD purchasing power 
parities is considered. With 6102 USD PPP the U.S. spends twice as much as Germany 
(3043 USD PPP) or the Netherlands (3041 USD PPP). The United Kingdom is even lower 
(2508 USD PPP). In 2003/2004 the U.S. health expenditure growth rate was 4.1 %, which 
is typical for recent years.
212
 The adjusted average real annual growth per capita from 1992-
2002 confirms these differences also in the long run, stating 3.3 % for the U.S. and only 2.0 
% for Germany.
213
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In 2004 the main source of the total 1.6 trillion USD health care spending was government 
funding with 44.4 %. Private group and individual health insurance (36.1 %) and out-of-
pocket payments (15.1 %) accounted for most of the rest.
214
 By 2007, the government share 
of health care expenditure is expected to be closer to 50 % as the effects of Medicare Part D 
(enacted 2006) were not yet visible in 2004.
215
 
5.3 Financing 
5.3.1 Identifying Sub-Systems 
The U.S. health system financing can be divided into different subsystems. These subsys-
tems are 
 Medicare, which covers elderly people over the age of 65 as well as certain groups 
of disabled people and patients with end-stage renal disease, 
 Medicaid, which is dedicated to certain deserving vulnerable groups of the popula-
tion, 
 the private health insurance sector, representing individual and group insurance, 
 several largely independent systems like the Veterans Administration or the Indian 
Health Service, with public financing arrangements and mostly their own dedicated 
facilities,
216
 and 
 the large number of uninsured who do not have any form of coverage. 
In 2005, approximately 13.7 % of the population were covered by Medicare.
217
 Of the pop-
ulation younger than 65 years 60.8 % were covered by employer based group health insur-
ance, 5.4 % by private non-group insurance, 15.9 % by Medicaid and other public programs 
and 17.9 % were uninsured.
218
 Circumstances vary significantly from state to state. For ex-
ample, the rate of uninsured people ranges from 8.7 % in Minnesota, and 15.6 % in North 
Carolina, up to 24.5 % in Texas.
219
 
The following sections provide some basic insight into the different subsystems.
220
 
5.3.2 Medicare 
Created in 1965, Medicare is a federal program for all people 65 and older as well as for 
younger people with permanent disabilities.
221
 In 2006 its total benefit payments were 374 
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billion USD. Costs for Medicare are sky-rocketing and with the baby-boomer generation 
hitting retirement age this trend will continue. Four different parts (Medicare Part A, B, C, 
and D) make up the whole Medicare system. 
Medicare Part A contributes to in-patient care, certain nursing facilities, home health, and 
hospice care. It is mainly funded through a payroll tax of 2.9 % which is shared in equal 
parts by the employer and the employee. 
Medicare Part B covers physicians fees,
222
 out-patient, home health, and preventive servic-
es. General tax revenue and a monthly premium of 88.5 USD (in 2006, expected to be 98.4 
USD in 2007) higher, income related premiums for those with income over 80,000 USD) 
finance this part. 
Medicare Part C represents the option for Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in private ma-
naged care plans, which combine Part A, Part B, and usually Part D. These plans were only 
recently revitalized; currently Medicare pays 111 % of costs that would accrue in the regu-
lar fee-for-service Medicare program towards these plans.
223
 
Until Medicare Part D went into effect in 2006, prescription drugs were not covered by 
Medicare. This new benefit is facilitated through private plans. Participants pay a monthly 
premium which averaged 25 USD across all plans in 2006. The rest is funded through gen-
eral revenues and state payments. 
Taken all parts together only about 45 % of beneficiaries‘ total costs are covered, the rest is 
paid for by patient co-payments or co-insurance. There is no cap on out-of-pocket spending, 
which is particularly high as long term care as well as vision and dental care are not in-
cluded. Consequently, many of the increasing number of elderly have to rely on co-
insurance through former or current employers (availability, however, is decreasing) or are 
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, but only if they meet the rigid Medicaid criteria 
outlined below. 
5.3.3 Medicaid 
Medicaid funding is shared by the federal government and the states. Prima facie it seems to 
be a general program for low income populations. However, by far not all poor people are 
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eligible, as, aside from income and asset criteria, categorical restrictions must be met simul-
taneously. Eligibility categories are pregnant women, children under the age of 19, parents 
of dependent children, disabled and elderly persons.
224
 States can decide to additionally 
cover optional services or to apply for waivers, which allow states to expand eligibility to 
different groups of people, or to make other amendments to the program. If somebody is 
eligible for Medicaid and is enrolled, the coverage is usually relatively comprehensive, 
even compared to what commercial insurances offer.
225
 
Closely linked to Medicaid is the State Children‘s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 
which provides coverage to a large group of children that otherwise would not be eligible 
under the restrictive Medicaid rules.
226
 
In 2003, covering more than 52 million people, Medicaid accounted for one sixth of per-
sonal health care spending in the U.S. and for almost half of the nation‘s spending on long-
term care. Medicaid, in the same way as Medicare, is a key component of the U.S. health 
system.
227
 Changes, for example with regard to reimbursement, can severely impact provid-
ers as well as other branches of health care coverage.
228
 
5.3.4 Private Employer Sponsored Health Insurance 
Since World War II employer based group health insurance has evolved to be the backbone 
of the American health insurance system.
229
 The term refers to the fact that insurance prod-
ucts are sponsored by the employer, rather than purchased by an individual consumer.
230
 
Considerable tax subsidies (estimates for 2004 suggest a figure around 209.9 billion USD) 
support this system.
231
 As the regulatory power over the insurance sector is with the states, 
the following descriptions are subject to sometimes subtle but nonetheless decisive varia-
tions across the nation.
232
 
Employer based group insurance means that an employer selects one or more insurance 
plans on behalf of the employees. Plans are community rated, i.e. there is no medical exam 
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or underwriting. Costs of premiums are usually shared between employer and employees.
233
 
For both participation is voluntary, i.e. companies do not have to offer insurance plans and 
workers are not mandated to purchase any of the offered plans. The range of options is 
highly correlated with the size of the employer. Larger companies usually offer several 
plans whereas 70 % of smaller ones have only one option (47 % overall), if any at all.
234
 In 
most cases employees can obtain better deals in the group market than in the individual 
market, for which increased bargaining power and administrative efficiencies are two rea-
sons. However, it is not possible to follow individual preferences; for example, the em-
ployee can not choose a less comprehensive but cheaper package than the one the employer 
offers. Although costs are the employers‘ key argument when deciding between different 
plans, the outcomes with regard to selection of qualitatively favorable plans seem to be pos-
itive overall.
235
 Certain drugs, as well as dental or vision care are generally not covered by 
an average health plan.
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Large employers tend to offer self-funded employee health benefit plans. In this case com-
panies build their own risk pools and usually purchase administrative services from com-
mercial insurance providers.
237
 
There are several problems attributed to this employer based system. A common argument 
is job-lock, which means that employees, especially those with higher health risks, hesitate 
to change employers as they might not be able to find a new similarly beneficial plan with a 
new employer or as their physician may have a contract with this, but not with another plan. 
These effects can be observed empirically, but welfare consequences are much more diffi-
cult to estimate.
238
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 tried to 
mitigate some of these factors but the link between employer and health insurance is still a 
barrier for employees and their families, especially when the new employer does not offer 
health insurance coverage at all.
239
 
Another fact is that employment based coverage is declining. One reason is that because of 
rising premiums fewer employees can afford it, especially as employers tend to increase the 
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workers‘ share of premium payments or co-payments to balance this trend.240 Furthermore, 
fewer employers offer health insurance coverage in the first place.
241
 Not all of the decline 
since 2000 has been absorbed by the individual insurance sector, which suggests that a sig-
nificant proportion of those losing employer based coverage were subsequently without 
insurance coverage.
242
 Another factor putting increased pressure on premiums in the group 
rated employer insurance market is the rising average age of employees due to general de-
mographic developments, thereby fostering adverse selection incentives.
243
 
5.3.5 Private Individual Insurance 
Private individual health insurance has a much smaller market share than employer based 
coverage. It generally is less federally regulated than group insurance; thus the remarks on 
variation of regulation between different states in chapter 5.3.4 apply at least as much for 
private individual insurance.
244
 
The main differences between group and individual insurance are medical underwriting and 
risk adjusted premiums. This means that depending on pre-existing conditions coverage can 
be restricted and/or premiums are increased. In certain cases coverage can be denied com-
pletely.
245
 Depending on state legislation and insurance plan, annual contract renewal re-
quirements are prevalent, which allow the insurance companies to increase premiums for 
patients according to illnesses they acquired in the preceding period. Any chronic condition 
represents a fundamental financial risk in this context.
246
 
Generally, individual health insurance is less comprehensive but more expensive than group 
insurance policies.
247
 
The role of individual private health insurance might become more predominant, if a pro-
posed change in the tax code is passed. This would subsidize consumers who buy insurance 
by themselves through a tax break. Currently tax subsidies are only available for employer 
based health insurance. However, to date the success of this endeavor is very uncertain.
248
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5.3.6 The Uninsured 
Prior to examining the financing of health care for the uninsured, some comments must be 
made who the uninsured are, especially because this group is very heterogeneous. 
In 2005, 46.1 million non-elderly Americans were without coverage. By only looking at 
their income level, leaving aside their medical condition and other factors, this number can 
be divided up into 25 % who are eligible for public coverage but are not enrolled, 56 % that 
are neither eligible nor can afford coverage without assistance, and 20 % who are not poor 
with regard to their income status but nonetheless forgo insurance coverage.
249
 Common 
reasons for the first group are lack of knowledge, bureaucratic obstacles, and social stigma. 
The second group, well, basically does not have enough political clout to cause the legisla-
ture to alleviate their situation. The third group consists mainly of people who do have sig-
nificant pre-existing conditions and therefore cannot purchase private health insurance at all 
or only at extremely high and thus unaffordable premiums. Another significant portion of 
this last group are free-riders who do not think that they have a relevant health risk and in 
case of emergency rely on the social safety-net.
250
 
Another group of concern are people who have insufficient coverage, which means that 
their insurance coverage does not protect them from catastrophic costs with regard to their 
income, be it through co-pays or deductibles. Including these underinsured Schoen, Doty et 
al. 2005 estimate that in 2003 35 % of the population (61 million people) was either all or 
for parts of the year uninsured, or did not have sufficient coverage.
251
 
Other results show that even short periods without coverage have negative effects on access 
to health care.
252
 Generally, the uninsured ―receive less preventive care, are diagnosed at 
more advanced disease stages, and once diagnosed, tend to receive less therapeutic care 
(drugs and surgical interventions); having health insurance would reduce mortality rates for 
the uninsured by 10-15 percent; and better health would improve annual earnings by about 
10-30 percent (…) and would increase educational attainment.‖253 
In 2004, people who were without health insurance all year long paid 35 % of their health 
care expenses out-of-pocket. Most of the rest accounted for uncompensated care which to-
taled 40.7 billion USD in the same year.
254
 The largest share of uncompensated care is pro-
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vided by hospitals (63 %), physicians (18 %), and clinics and direct care programs (19 
%).
255
 However, not all of the uncompensated care is truly uncompensated. In 2004, federal, 
state and local funding covered about 85 % of uncompensated care through various pro-
grams.
256
 The remainder of the costs are shifted to insured patients by implicitly pricing 
uncompensated care into their bill.
257
 
5.4 Insurance Carriers 
The current health insurance market is characterized by extremely high and even further 
increasing concentration. Many commercial health insurance markets are dominated by two 
or three companies.
258
 These companies increasingly carry all types of products, many of 
which were originally offered by niche insurance companies.
259
 At the same time, they 
serve all potential customers from individuals and employers to public payers.
260
 Over the 
past few years profit margins and other financial key indicators of insurance companies 
performance were excellent across the board, and non-profit plans were able to accumulate 
extraordinary reserves.
261
 
Other factors that are relevant in concentrated markets support this picture. Due to the lack 
of real innovations (as HMOs were several decades ago) there is only a very limited threat 
to market shares from new entrants, especially as all the big players also offer new products, 
such as high-deductible plans. Therefore, competition with substitute products is very li-
mited. Whenever a new company enters a market this usually happens through acquisition 
thus rather increasing concentration. On the supplier side similar concentration trends can 
be observed. However, insurers were able to pass on increased prices and in most cases 
even maintained or even decreased the medical cost ratio. On the purchaser side employers 
and consumers were unable to build up sufficient pressure in this highly concentrated mar-
ket.
262
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Of all insurers Blue Cross and Blue Shield are unique and play a dominant role. Though 
being state specific and technically owned by separate companies, they cooperate, for ex-
ample, to serve multi-state employers or for branding campaigns. If considered as one com-
pany, they account for 44 % of the national market, and after excluding their for-profit 
branches they still represent 31 %. Regional for-profit plans do not dominate a single mar-
ket, and on the national level, besides the ―Blues‖ there are only three major commercial 
insurance carriers (United Health Group, Aetna, CIGNA) left.
263
 
In the short term price competition is likely to hold down premiums (the 7.7 % in 2006 was 
the lowest premium growth rate since 2000), the high reserves of non-profit carriers being 
one of the reasons for this. However, prospects are highly uncertain.
264
 
As expansion through new products or acquisition reaches its limits, public programs are 
currently one of the most interesting fields. Medicare and Medicaid increasingly purchase 
commercial insurance products and plan management capacities, Medicare Part C and D 
completely build on private plans. Nonetheless, concentration trends are prevalent in this 
relatively new sector too. Furthermore, this public purchasing frequently leads to monopso-
ny-like situations that bring their own set of problems.
265
 
5.5 Providers 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the organization of health services delivery has undergone 
significant changes.
266
 Core trends were horizontal consolidation of physicians and of hos-
pitals as well as vertical integration of various forms between the two.
267
 In 2005, 55 % of 
all U.S. community hospitals were part of a hospital system (with central ownership and 
management function) and 29 % were members in a hospital network.
268
 The aim was to 
increase bargaining power to be able to negotiate on a level playing field with managed care 
organizations which frequently held monopsonies. Efficiency gains and consequently lower 
prices were the exception; on the contrary, in less competitive markets the opposite oc-
curred.
269
 
However, this trend of integration is slightly changing. According to one study, in 
2000/2001, 65 % of hospitals interviewed owned  primary care physician practices, espe-
cially in concentrated markets, but the majority of hospitals has reduced the size of such 
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practices in recent years.
270
 This is similar to horizontal integration of physician practices. 
Whereas thousands of IPAs were created in the late 1980s and early 1990s the number has 
dropped significantly. Factors like uncertain financial benefits, high start-up costs and anti-
trust risks are likely to have led to this change.
271
 
5.6 A Brief History 
Around the time when social health insurance was established in Europe, starting with 
Germany in 1883, health insurance was no issue at all in the U.S. Government was vastly 
decentralized, so that any countrywide action on such issues was unlikely in the first place. 
Furthermore, there was no major threat to social and political stability as there was in Eu-
rope, and the socialist party played no relevant role in U.S. politics.
272
 When finally, during 
the first decade of the twentieth century, often inspired by their European counterparts, ear-
ly movements towards comprehensive health insurance began, they faced a quite unlikely 
coalition of insurance and pharmaceutical companies, christian scientists, businesses, physi-
cians and unions opposing any government interference on these issues.
273
 Another strike 
against early health insurance movements was the beginning of World War I, which opened 
the door for defamatory rhetoric, portraying social or mandatory health insurance as pater-
nalistic, incompatible with American values, and designed by America‘s war enemies.274 
After being silenced for several years, the following decades saw a number of propositions 
come and go. Rapidly increasing costs and adverse economic circumstances (e.g., the Great 
Depression) changed some of the key players‘ minds, but never achieved a majority large 
enough to produce any significant results on a nationwide level. Government funding was 
directed towards public health or scattered around incremental social security initiatives. 
However, as physicians‘ and hospitals‘ income became more and more insecure, pre-paid 
hospital plans emerged, representing the early beginnings of private health insurance in the 
1920s.
275
 Originally, those plans‘ prime intention was to secure provider income rather than 
patient financial wellbeing. However, although facing various obstacles – also from within 
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the medical profession – these developments built the basis for the first Blue Cross plans.276 
The way private health insurance came into existence, driven by the economic need of pro-
viders, partly explains how today‘s system is set up.277 Attracted from the early successes 
commercial insurance companies entered the field and – due to a lack of ties with hospitals 
and other providers – followed a cash-indemnity strategy. By 1941, altogether a total of 
12.3 million Americans had health insurance. No plan, however, provided comprehensive 
benefits; all were subjects to caps, for example, maximum days of hospital care or restric-
tive financial limits.
278
 
The 1940s put health reform back on the political agenda, but did not achieve much more 
than symbolic value.
279
 Some war related policies, however, would shape the organization 
of private health insurance and contribute significantly to today‘s system. As wages were 
frozen to stabilize the war economy during times of worker shortage, companies had to use 
other means to compete for employees, one of them being the provision of social benefits 
like health insurance. Favorable tax codes did their part to rapidly spread employer based 
health insurance.
280
 Since then, health insurance typically has always been part of em-
ployees‘ overall compensation package.281 
Back on the political venue, by 1950, three major attempts to establish some form of com-
prehensive social health insurance had failed and a pattern that could be observed since 
1935 was confirmed: ―Instead of a single health insurance system for the entire population, 
America would have a system of private insurance for those who could afford it and public 
welfare services for the poor.‖282 
Over the years community rated Blue Cross plans faced severe adverse selection problems, 
when competing against experience rating commercial insurers. The population group 
which suffered most from the effects, intensified by sharply rising medical costs, were the 
elderly, especially when Blue Cross finally had to give in and changed to experience rating 
too.
283
 Proponents of universal coverage saw this as a chance to make at least an incremen-
tal step towards their goal by establishing universal coverage for the elderly. This group 
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seemed to be especially favorable for their undertaking as, according to the American pub-
lic opinion, they are needy and deserving. Nonetheless, this was no easy undertaking, and it 
took fifteen years until, in 1965, a bill aiming at a minimal consensus was passed. Although 
coverage was still very restrictive and had several caps, it was a significant move that gave 
the government a substantial role in organizing health insurance, far more than most people 
originally had expected.
284
 
In the same bill in which Medicare was passed an afterthought was tweaked in: Medicaid. It 
comprised several parts which were related to the poor and promised assistance based on 
means testing. The way it was assembled did not promise a very successful future. Howev-
er, although still far from perfect, Medicaid has expanded more than most had expected.
285
 
Rising costs of the Medicare budget in the early seventies triggered another piece of legisla-
tion, the so called HMO Act. Health maintenance organizations had existed for a long pe-
riod of time, but without playing any significant role. Trying to control expenditures, the 
HMOs‘ capitation concept was appealing, as the fee-for-service approach seemed to present 
wrong incentives. The act provided financial support, overrode state legislature that ham-
pered HMO proliferation and required certain employers to offer at least two HMO options 
to their employees. Thus, HMOs enjoyed continued growth over the following decades.
286
 
Another managed care development took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Preferred 
provider organizations emerged, which were distinct from HMOs, as they did not accept 
capitation risk, and patients were able to access out-of-network providers without losing all 
their coverage benefits. Other features, like utilization review mechanisms, developed in 
other health insurance sectors, and on the provider side a trend towards larger and thus more 
powerful integrated care delivery systems, like physician-hospital organizations, could be 
observed.
287
 
The reliance of government programs on managed care organizations (Medicare and Medi-
caid purchase services in the commercial sector) and continuous, although not always 
equally strong legislative support helped various kinds of managed care organizations to 
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spread, mainly at the expense of conventional indemnity insurance as Figure 5 illustrates. 
The early 1990s were the strongest growth period of this trend.
288
 
At the same time the Clinton health reform plan was another attempt to achieve universal 
coverage, granting this right to all Americans in a way that ―it can never be taken away.‖289 
This highly complex reform proposal tried to integrate the best of many different streams of 
thought, but failed to be ever passed.
290
 
In the last decade of the twentieth century managed care organizations greatly diversified. 
The traditional group-HMO lost market share and a plethora of different variations of hybr-
ids evolved, some of them closer to PPOs, others more like POS organizations;
291
 ―there are 
no clear distinctions between health care plan types anymore‖292 and it is close to impossi-
ble to provide meaningful characterizations for any of them.
293
 
The relative decline of HMOs was probably the first sign of what has become known as the 
managed care backlash. Extensive literature gives insight into the many potential reasons 
for this sudden retreat from managed care.
294
 A key aspect probably was that the public 
image of HMOs became extremely negative.
295
 Patients reacted fiercely against restrictions 
applied by HMOs and providers shared this antipathy. Negative media coverage did the 
rest.
296
 Employers dropped HMO coverage and capitation payment declined sharply.
297
 
Consequently, today the somewhat stigmatized term ―managed care‖ is used only with great 
caution. But this does not mean that there is no more management of costs and care. Basi-
cally all insurance plans use cost control measures and some kind of utilization review.
298
 
The newest trend are high-deductible health plans with a saving option (HDHP/SO), which 
were introduced only recently and are aimed at demand-side incentivizing.
299
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Figure 5: Plan Enrollment By Covered Workers & Plan Type, Selected Years 1988–
2006 
Source: Own illustration, based on Claxton, Gabel et al. 2006, p. 482. 
5.7 Conclusion 
What is coming up in the 21
st
 century? Currently health care researchers and policy makers 
think that the 2008 presidential elections might provide a new chance to leave incremental-
ism behind and to take on substantial health reform. The future will tell if this hope is justi-
fied. 
Due to the brevity of this chapter, significant aspects had to be omitted, for example, the 
highly important role of the states in shaping the health care sector. Thus, the message to be 
taken away from this chapter is that the history of the U.S. health system is eventful, and a 
meaningful understanding of the status quo requires at least awareness of how things have 
evolved.  
6 The North Carolinian Health Care Market 
6.1 Approach 
In earlier chapters economic theory was elaborated on to shed light onto the insurer-
provider relationship, in particular into incentive compatibility and organizational form. 
This chapter tries to capture the current situation in North Carolina with regard to these spe-
cific questions, thereby providing a ―real-world‖ benchmark. 
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To assess many of the relevant aspects like risk attitude or specificity of investments, it is 
important to capture stakeholders‘ perceptions. These may occasionally diverge from ob-
served facts. However, when executives make decisions, for example about organizational 
forms, their judgment is not only based on objective facts, but also on the facts as seen and 
interpreted from the actor‘s point of view.300 Thus, this chapter combines information and 
data derived from literature with insights gained from the qualitative interviews which were 
described in chapter 1.4.2.
301
 
First, after describing very briefly the state of North Carolina, key market characteristics are 
outlined, focusing on issues that were frequently raised in the interviews and that are expli-
citly or implicitly related to the theory this analysis is built on. Thus, the aspects of concen-
tration, competition, insurer-provider power balance and regulation indicate whether pro-
viders and insurers act under circumstances similar to those assumed above or if other con-
founding variables have to be taken into account. 
Second, returning to the structure used before the excursus, the parameters measurability 
and information asymmetry, risk and risk attitudes, specificity, uncertainty, and frequency 
are scrutinized to elaborate to which extent they are present and relevant in the decision 
making process. 
The last step focuses on the predicted outcomes themselves. Incentive compatibility, orga-
nizational form and general outcomes with regard to access, costs, and quality are ex-
amined. 
It is important to note that all of these sections are intended to be descriptive of the facts and 
the perceptions collected. An assessment will be conducted at a later stage.
302
 
6.2 Prologue: North Carolina – The State 
In 2005, 8,682,066 people lived in North Carolina, a state which comprises 100 counties.
303
 
The state is mainly rural with few urban areas. Of the latter two are most noteworthy: Char-
lotte, the state‘s largest city (about 600,000 inhabitants), and the so called Research Trian-
gle, which comprises Durham, Chapel Hill and the state‘s capital, Raleigh. The Triangle is 
characterized by a large number of research institutions, related companies and universities. 
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The rest of the state is extremely rural. On average, there are 64 persons per square kilome-
ter in North Carolina, compared to 231 persons per square kilometer in Germany and 75 
persons per square kilometer in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the state with the lowest 
population density in Germany. Thus, there is a significant rural-urban divide in the state 
that goes along with significant variations of parameters like income level and health insur-
ance coverage.
304
 
6.3 Market Characteristics and Entrepreneurial Freedom 
6.3.1 Concentration 
One central characteristic of the North Carolinian health care market is the increasing con-
centration which has occurred over the last 10 or 15 years. In the early 1990s about 21 or 22 
insurance and HMO companies were in the market. At least 15 of those were considered 
strong competitors in 1993. In 2003, when about 86 % of private health insurance contracts 
were employer sponsored, the largest plan in this sector had 50 %, the three largest plans 
together 91 % of the business.
305
 Although the large group market is characterized by high 
client-turnover rates around 20 % – 25 % this has been rather stable over recent years. The 
few new entrants into this market have decreased rather than increased the number of com-
petitors in the market, as these steps were usually performed through acquisitions or mer-
gers and most large players already had some kind of subsidiary in place. Companies that 
were not able or willing to invest in trends like managed care and networks did not sur-
vive.
306
 This led to a still continuing trend of big players getting bigger and the small ones 
getting smaller. All the ones that remain have acquired other players. Of the nation‘s five 
largest insurers four are present in North Carolina and add up to a cumulative market share 
of 94 %.
307
 Looking at specific segments the picture is the same. For example, in the small 
group market for employers with up to 50 lives two or three strong competitors are domi-
nating few smaller ―B-players‖. 
With regard to the individual sector the situation is even more extreme. Until recently 
BCBSNC was the only source for this kind of insurance, as all other competitors have left 
the state. Consequently, BCBSNC took over all existing memberships and expanded its 
membership rapidly. By legal mandate BCBSNC is required to offer every North Caroli-
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nian at least one health insurance policy option for an underwritten, risk adjusted price.
308
 
Estimates by the North Carolina Department of Insurance for 2005 state a 95 % to 99 % 
market share of BCBSNC for individual health insurance. In 2006 WellPath was the first 
large national player to start actively marketing individual health insurance in North Caroli-
na. Due to the overall decline of group insurance it is likely that further insurance carriers 
will follow, aiming to expand in the growing individual market. However, this is again quite 
likely to be restricted to the few large national insurance companies.
309
 
On the provider side a very similar trend can be observed. Over the past 10 years providers 
formed large organizations, bundling formerly independent hospitals into systems and buy-
ing independent physician practices. For example, in Charlotte there are two primary sys-
tems left, of which the larger one, Carolina Health Systems, owns most of the primary care 
physicians. There are only few urban areas left where a choice of different independent 
hospitals or hospital systems exists. In the rural areas the common problem is usually to 
have at least one specialist of each kind within an accessible distance. ―So you go into most 
communities around the state and you have one group of surgeons, one group ENT, one 
group OB/GYN and you have five or six groups of primary care physicians – and people 
see county boundaries as if they were the Great Wall of China.‖310 In the market of cross 
specialty PPOs the largest one was Raleigh-based, physician-owned Health Care Savings 
which had absorbed all competitors over the years. It merged with the hospital-led provider 
systems MedCost in 2006.
311
 Again the Triangle stands out, as it is perceived to have a 
higher number of physicians as well as a choice of hospital systems and thus a more com-
petitive environment. 
6.3.2 Competition 
Market concentration itself tells relatively little about competition. Thus, this section looks 
into competition of insurers and providers, again focusing on the perception of key stake-
holders. 
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 Atlantic Information Services 2006, n.p. ―(…) as the employer provided health insurance shrinks, (…) 
you really have to go out there, these people didn‘t just evaporate. (…)We have lots of group people who 
are still in groups, but the employers are saying I give you 500 dollars a month and go out and find your 
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through their employer.‖ Interview. 
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 Interview. Similar in another interview: ―Physicians have began to form larger groups, (…) for instance, 
orthopedic surgeons in Charlotte, there were two big groups, they came together in one. Everybody who 
wants to come to the town has to negotiate with this one big group. They have been spreading into other 
counties around - so now it is not only in Charlotte, but in multiple counties around them.‖ 
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 Such a PPO would manage its own network and „rent it out― to insurance companies, which hold the 
financial pooling risk. 
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The insurance sector has to be divided up into the individual market, the small group market 
and the large group market. Until recently, the monopolistic position of BCBSNC in the 
individual market led to a ―no-choice‖ situation for consumers and hence ―virtually no 
competition‖.312 For a long time there was also no threat that other competitors would enter 
this market as it was relatively small. Now, as the first large insurance companies enter this 
segment in North Carolina it is yet to be seen over the next few years, whether they are able 
to challenge the incumbent. 
The small group market is similarly dominated by BCBSNC, although other companies 
operate in this area as well. The high turnover rates indicate that the large group market is 
more competitive. Price is the main factor relevant for companies purchasing health insur-
ance on behalf of their employees. Nonetheless, BCBSNC seems to be able to maintain 
prices 5 % to 10 % higher than its competitors by relying on its name, its history and on the 
demand by consumers who are overall fairly satisfied with their products. A recurring 
theme is that BCBSNC plays in its own league, while the smaller insurers compete with 
each other. 
Other parameters, like quality, are less relevant. One reason for this is that employers find it 
difficult to understand and assess quality. However, premium rates are all relatively similar 
in North Carolina, which makes aspects like service level, distance to agents, provider net-
work density and access more important. But often employers are not aware of their leve-
rage, for example, in issues such as which providers to include in the plan‘s network. 
On the provider side, again, ―there is a wide difference, the ‗two Carolinas‘‖.313 Overall 
providers do – at times rather aggressively – compete for patients. With the influx of ma-
naged care and similar changes in the health system physician collegiality seems to be less 
present today than it was in the past. But in many, especially rural or certain highly concen-
trated urban areas, there is no competing provider in place. The certificate-of-need system 
makes it furthermore very difficult for new hospital providers to enter an existing market.
314
 
In areas that do have different hospitals and physician groups, there definitely is a consider-
able amount of competition for patients; ―in particular provider groups or hospitals want to 
be known as ‗the‘ patient preferred place to go to for a particular service. In the last 10 
years there has been more advertising, there has been more aggressive development of spe-
cialty services, a lot more competition for new MRIs, or new trauma designations, or new 
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 ―Certificate-of-need laws prohibit the development of new healthcare facilities and services unless the 
provider can demonstrate to the satisfaction of state officials that the proposed facilities and services are 
needed.‖ Harris 2003, p. 79. 
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specialty hospital designations, so that they have another star on their ad, so to speak, so 
that I think they are trying to attract people to their hospital or their group instead of another 
one.‖315 Thus, they mainly compete in terms of services and quality but ―in terms of ‗I want 
to be the lowest cost system in town‘ – we have not seen it.‖316 Prices and costs play virtual-
ly no role when providers compete for patients. On the contrary, it is usually impossible to 
obtain anything like a quote prior to receiving diagnostic or therapeutic services in a hospit-
al. The fact that providers can maintain this scheme is especially surprising as patients are 
charged considerable co-pays. One reason for the lack of price competition between provid-
ers be the power balance between insurers and providers when contracts have to be nego-
tiated. 
6.3.3 Insurer-Provider Power Balance 
There are several motives to consolidate and build larger groups, for example access to cap-
ital and supply purchasing power.
317
 But the increasing power of the larger growing insur-
ance carriers has been the main reason for consolidation on the provider side. Providers had 
realized that as individuals they had not any clout. ―It was like physics, equal reactions. The 
payers have gotten larger and larger and as they have gotten larger and control more territo-
ry that stimulated the providers more and more to find a way to fight them. And it is all 
about the money.‖318 Single doctors, especially, do not have a chance at all. After consoli-
dation on both sides, in many cases, situations similar to a bilateral monopoly appear. A 
monopolistic provider network that has ―the only show in town‖ on the one side versus 
BCBSNC with about 60 percent market share on the other side. As no party can do without 
the other one, standoffs are the result which occasionally led to a few month pro forma sus-
pension of the contract. In most cases the question is, if one side can do without the other or 
not, and usually they cannot.
319
 This seems to be especially critical for providers that state 
that, as soon as a particular insurer‘s patients make up more than 20 % of their business, 
they are captivated. 
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 Interview. As Ho 2005, p. 2, observes, hospitals strategically invest in characteristics that increase their 
bargaining power. 
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 ―Could I do business in Durham without Duke? No! They have all the hospitals in town. And (…) they 
have all the physicians in town. Literally 99 %. So, I cannot really live without those. If there was a solo 
practice in Durham county and we were at odds what the right fee is, then (…) [I might contract] be-
cause I want to have them in my network, but both parties can live without each other, if they reach an 
obstacle.‖ Interview. 
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Although insurance companies have an interest in lower prices for powerful hospital pro-
viders and their related physician networks, a backward accounting system has evolved.
320
 
Today, by and large providers receive the largest share of their revenue out of government 
sources like Medicare and Medicaid, on which they have almost no direct influence. Thus, 
the private insurers are seen and used as some kind of collective residual claimant, to whom 
providers pass on the difference between expenditure and government revenue. But ―[w]ith 
the exception of very large research hospitals and their related physician groups the health 
plans have all – in my observation – all of the power. They write the contract, they set the 
terms, and it‘s often provided in a take it or leave it manner.‖321 Insurers on the other side 
are to a very large extent capable of passing the medical costs on to the consumer, as they 
have maintained the medical cost ratio on a fairly stable level even during periods in which 
prices for medical care have increased tremendously.
322
 
6.3.4 Regulation 
In such a highly concentrated market good regulation is obviously essential. The following 
thus tries to look at two different aspects. First, at competition law, which aims at maintain-
ing a competitive marketplace and protecting consumers; second, how overall regulation of 
providers and insurers restricts their entrepreneurial freedom.
323
 
Overall, competition law is indirectly empowering insurers, acting as consumers‘ agents, by 
being more lenient with them compared to the provider side.
324
 This becomes obvious, if 
legislation like the Sherman Act, which exempts health insurance carriers from large por-
tions of antitrust regulation, or a recent report on the role of competition law in the health 
sector, focusing in its recommendations solely on providers, are considered.
325
 
In North Carolina the strong position of BCBSNC in certain market segments has caused 
some concern in the past. But attempts to apply competition law failed, mainly due to the 
organization‘s non-profit status. On the provider side a certificate-of-need system strictly 
regulates the concession of health care providers. This presents significant market entrance 
and exit barriers, as incumbents are largely protected against new startups.
326
 Smaller pro-
viders, like physician groups, feel disadvantaged, as they are not allowed to bargain collec-
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Interview. 
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tively with insurers‘ payment issues. ―[D]octor providers are limited by regulations more 
than other providers. More than hospitals. (…) there have been several well-publicized cas-
es of provider groups who have been sanctioned by the federal trade commission for anti-
trust activity. (…) So, there are no really powerful physician groups battling against the 
health plans.‖327 This means that PPOs can enter a contract on behalf of the affiliated physi-
cians, but the fee schedule is not included. Using a ―messenger model‖ each physician has 
to submit her fee schedule herself. Therefore, physician associations can address issues like 
costs or quality, but not level of payments.
328
 
The Department of Insurance furthermore regulates the contracts between insurance carriers 
and providers. Thereby it foremost focuses on protecting the insurance-buying public. As 
managed care has become more and more sophisticated over the years, and new potential 
risk factors have emerged that might pose a threat to the continuity of or access to care, an 
array of laws has been passed since the early 1990s. In 2002, these were brought together to 
form the Patients Bill of Rights.
329
 ―This regulatory framework was crafted to ensure that 
managed care plans have systems to develop and maintain a network of providers sufficient 
to deliver covered services, that medical management procedures are developed and admi-
nistered in accordance with minimum standards, so that coverage will not be denied in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner, and that insureds have a reasonable standardized process 
through which they can appeal insurer decisions.‖330 This is complemented by several sin-
gle issue laws focusing on specific aspects, like the mandate to cover a certain procedure. 
Furthermore, legislation is in place to regulate the insurer-provider relationship, ensuring, 
for example, prompt payment and unified provider credentialing. Thus, ―managed care 
plans are subject to an extraordinary array of detailed regulation‖.331 
In consequence, this means that insurance carriers have to be certified for each county in 
which they want to operate, and have to submit each type of insurer contract which they 
want to use to the Department of Insurance for prior approval. 
However, insurance companies do not feel that these regulations restrict them in an exces-
sive way or that it stifles competition. Decisions are still based on entrepreneurial insight, 
                                                 
327
 Interview. 
328
 For an in-depth overview of antitrust issues with regard to IPAs and similar organizations see Casalino 
2006, pp. 569-585. 
329
 Cf. Morales Burke 2003, p. 37 
330
 Morales Burke 2003, pp. 37-38. This comprises for example standards for provider credentialing, ade-
quacy of networks, utilization review, appeal and grievance processes, quality assurance programs, and 
disclosure of certain information to costumers. 
331
 Morales Burke 2003, p. 38. 
 70 
rather than regulatory requirements.
332
 This is similar on the provider side, although espe-
cially small providers seem to believe that certain restrictions of their freedom do lead to a 
situation in which ―the table is not level.‖333 
Summarizing, this means that there is legislation in place to maintain a competitive market 
place. At this stage it remains to be seen, if this legislation really supports its goal, especial-
ly considering its health sector specific exemptions. This issue requires further investiga-
tion. Nonetheless it can be stated that, although insurers and providers are subject to com-
prehensive regulation, they are to a large extent capable of designing and implementing 
strategies that they expect to be in their best interest. 
6.4 Insurer-provider Relationships in North Carolina 
6.4.1 General Assumptions 
The preceding chapter has set the scene in which both players act. Before having a closer 
look at the parameters defining incentive payments and organizational form, it has to be 
evaluated, if the insurer-provider relationship is one of a principal and an agent as assumed 
in chapter 4.1. 
On the macro level, regulation, like through competition laws, gives more freedom to insur-
ers, which act as purchasers, rather than to providers, which sell services.
334
 Besides the role 
of purchasing a service, the initiative to offer a contract is also a characteristic typical for a 
principal. In North Carolina it indeed is the case that, with few exceptions, insurers offer 
providers a contract, often on a take it or leave it basis.
335
 Furthermore, the state‘s regulato-
ry entities see the insurer as the entity that has to ensure adequate provider behavior: ―typi-
cally the carrier has responsibility for its providers. (…) So we would look to the carrier to 
enforce compliance, to resolve any conflict that they may have. (…) The carrier does have 
obligations under our rules, our laws, that they have to monitor and oversee the provider 
activities and for issues that may not be clearly defined in their contract form they would 
have opportunity typically annually to address those.‖336 Considering all this there is sound 
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evidence that in North Carolina insurance companies have the more proactive role of a 
principal and providers act as their agents. 
Furthermore, the interviewees established that in spite of significant regulation the players‘ 
strategic decisions and measures are based on their entrepreneurial insight.
337
 This means 
that there are no external forces that would prohibit them from considering transaction costs 
as a decisive parameter in their deliberations on how to structure their business relation-
ships. 
Having thus sketched out the scene in which both players act, as well as how the relation-
ship between the two of them is setup, the following sections focus on the parameters that 
are assumed to define payment method and organizational form. 
6.4.2 Peculiarity and Relevance of Parameters 
6.4.2.1 Measurability and Information Asymmetry 
Like all other parameters, measurability and information asymmetry are not truly indepen-
dent factors, but are to a large extent determined through the organizational form that de-
fines the insurer-provider relationship as well as the incentive compatibility measures that 
are in place. Acknowledging these interdependencies, the following sections on parameters 
try to single out aspects that are not, or only to a limited extent, specific to or an effect of a 
specific setup of the insurer-provider relationship. 
Insurers and providers recognize that there is information asymmetry between the two of 
them. Similar to individual patients, purchasers have difficulties in assessing a provider‘s 
quality, especially prior to entering a contractual relationship. Furthermore, the large num-
ber of aspects that feed into the quality vector, and the difficulty to assess these appropriate-
ly, are important concerns. Although claims data is relatively easy to obtain, it only shows a 
part of the picture. To be able to evaluate performance in a meaningful way significant ef-
forts have to be made which are likely to be expensive, no matter whether ex post case note 
audits are performed or ex ante certification is conducted.
338
 Certain relevant background 
information on a specific provider or her community simply are not recorded on paper. 
Consequently, the larger an organization is, the more difficult it becomes to obtain such 
personal knowledge.
339
 Even for physicians it is difficult to assess their own performance 
and to identify problems that do require attention. To do this, a certain level of infrastruc-
ture to collect, analyze and compare data is required. Generally, at this time no party thinks 
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that it is currently achievable to measure true outcomes as a primary indicator. Therefore 
process and input criteria will play a key role in the near future. In spite of the fact that there 
is significant political pressure to move towards pay-for-performance, some insurers hesi-
tate as they are worried to waste money by starting such a reimbursement system without 
being able to handle the above mentioned problems effectively. 
Summarizing, it can be stated that providers and insurers recognize significant difficulties in 
measuring several dimensions of health care services. Thus, both sides portray a very diffe-
rentiated picture, taking into account various problems and costs that arise when complex 
(quality-) questions have to be assessed and information has to be passed on. What worries 
them most is not the difficulty of measuring performance or outcomes itself, but the prob-
lems arising when a reimbursement system is implemented which would require adequate, 
outcome based performance measures. 
6.4.2.2 Risk and Risk Attitudes 
Measurability problems and information asymmetry present the reason why a more sophis-
ticated payment system is needed to achieve incentive compatibility. Risk and risk attitudes, 
however, are relevant for the concrete design of the payment system, especially taking into 
account the trade-off between risk premium and incentive intensity, as well as quality and 
costs. 
Looking at risk itself the conducted interviews did not present any evidence that risk arising 
from random incidents of illness or demographic changes pose a considerable concern to 
any of the players. However, especially small providers with limited bargaining power and, 
in this respect, relatively unfavorable regulation do feel at risk as they cannot control their 
income; the reason for this being that they can neither determine what they charge nor 
which patients they see. In consequence, a change of the fee schedule of a large public pro-
gram like Medicare can pose a significant problem, as their possibilities to shift costs are 
limited. So, especially ambulatory care providers try to diversify the portfolio of their ser-
vices, a strategy that can hardly be performed by an individual physician, who is neither 
member of a larger group practice nor of a network. 
However, networks and larger hospitals are also to a certain extent at risk. Especially with 
regard to expensive high-tech procedures, like in some cardiovascular centers, small num-
ber changes in the supply of patients can have a significant impact on the financial situation. 
Vertical integration with primary care providers, as performed by all big hospital systems in 
North Carolina, can help to reduce this uncertainty. 
 73 
With regard to third party payers‘ interference in their business providers not surprisingly 
express reservations. These reservations, however, are at least to some extent caused by the 
fear of being excluded from an essential network because of the higher costs caused through 
a sicker population or through higher quality of care, which they deliver. 
On the insurance side, it was mentioned that BCBSNC, although currently very big in this 
market, has no means to expand into other geographic areas, and thus lacks the possibility 
to balance market specific risks.
340
 
With regard to risk and risk attitudes it can be summarized that all players are exposed to 
some kind of risk and that the capability of risk diversification indeed is an important aspect 
besides the pure size of an organization. Providers try to reduce this uncertainty by building 
networks and vertically integrated delivery systems that not only spread risk, but also give 
more control over patient referrals, and increase bargaining power. Thus, risk attitudes seem 
to be a relevant factor for the design of incentive compatible payment methods. 
6.4.2.3 Objective Functions 
Besides risk and risk attitudes the different players‘ objective functions play a crucial role in 
designing incentive compatible payment systems. According to perceptions obtained in 
interviews, providers‘ objective functions are determined by the bottom line ―(…) no mon-
ey, no mission.‖341 All types of providers are restricted by what they do through this factor. 
Besides that, there is agreement that physicians do want to care for their patients, hence in 
economic terms, it is in the physicians‘ best interest to increase their utility by taking care of 
patients. However, differences can be observed between specialties, for example comparing 
extremely patient-focused pediatricians with more technical oriented orthopedists. The fact 
that money nonetheless matters can be illustrated through multiple examples in North Caro-
lina. For example, dentists refused to see children on Medicaid because they believed reim-
bursement was too low. Other important parameters for physicians are aspects like working 
time and lifestyle which seem to become increasingly more important. This could indicate 
that at least some efforts to reduce costs, for example working overtime to see more patients 
or to spend more time with a patient to identify not only the best, but also the most cost ef-
fective option, are expensive due to significant opportunity costs. All of this is in accor-
dance with the providers‘ objective function which was constructed based on theoretical 
considerations in chapter 3.3.3.2. 
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Financial success is definitely a key factor on the insurance companies‘ side. Although 
some players like BCBSNC have a considerable and well publicized track record of contri-
buting to charity care and of engaging in initiatives to improve the situation of the uninsured 
or to achieve other societal goals, others do not see this as a key objective of their undertak-
ing. The latter ones mainly focus on their function to facilitate payments and bear the insur-
ance risk. High customer turnover rates, which make it difficult to capture benefits like 
long-term expenditure savings, may be one reason for this focus. Considering additionally 
that the limited role of competitive parameters, like quality compared to price and costs (cf. 
chapter 6.3.2), the quality parameter of the insurers‘ objective function in chapter 3.3.3.2 
seem to have a much weaker foundation than the cost aspect. 
6.4.2.4 Specificity 
In New Institutional Economics literature specificity of investments is regarded as the most 
important parameter with regard to choice of the organizational form.
342
 Therefore, the in-
terview outline covers this aspect in-depth. 
On the provider side, specificity of investments is not deemed to be of a high degree.
343
 
Neither investment into specific sites nor into physical assets seems to be of importance. 
However, ―[e]ach managed care company has its own forms, policies, procedures, phone 
numbers for certification and approval, and benefit restrictions. There has been little attempt 
in North Carolina at standardization and simplification. Consequently, physician office 
staffing has had to increase and specialize to handle the workload―.344 This would suggest 
that there exists at least some insurer-specific information technology and specialization of 
workforce and thus human asset specificity. However, while in the interviews this has been 
confirmed as a source of great administrative burden and high costs, it was not deemed to 
be relation-specific to an extent, that it would influence providers that have to decide if the 
contractual relationship with a carrier should be continued or not. The standardization of 
claims processing through HIPAA legislation also helped to reduce this specificity to a cer-
tain extent. 
Considering that providers are highly dependent on insurers funneling patients through their 
practices and hospitals (cf. chapter 6.3.3), dedicated assets seem to play a significant role. 
Statements like ―[o]nce it goes over about 20 % you are hooked‖ suggest that providers do 
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have a de facto dedicated capacity available that they cannot easily and quickly readjust.
345
 
Although providers do spend significant amounts of money on advertising and branding, 
these investments are not directed towards a specific insurer. One aspect that could count 
towards intangibles or brand name assets is the fact that carriers have an interest in enter-
taining valued partners, which gives reputation a certain weight. But as reputation is not 
necessarily relation specific, this category of relational specificity is not very strong either. 
On the insurer side the feedback is similar. Although there are some investments that are 
specific to geographic regions, these are not tied to a specific provider and thus do not 
present site specific investments for a relationship. Usually neither physical nor human as-
sets are dedicated to a specific provider, and case they are, they are easily re-deployable to 
another one. The reason being primarily that there ―are very few situations, where there is 
only one of something.‖346 This means that there are either other providers or provider 
groups of the same specialty, or other hospitals that an insurance company has contracts 
with. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between different specialties.
347
 For 
the same reasons it is unlikely that an insurance carrier has significant amounts of assets 
dedicated to a specific provider that are problematic to redeploy, if the contract is cancelled. 
As for intangible and brand name assets the picture is similar. Although insurance carriers 
advertise certain provider initiatives, like a quality initiative by BCBSNC for bariatric sur-
gery, or reference their extensive provider network, they do not tend to invest in provider 
specific public relations campaigns.
348
 
Summarizing, it can be stated that providers perform relation-specific investments on a low 
to modest level. If insurers face any such investments at all, they are probably even lower. 
Consequently, no party sees a need for organizational measures to avoid transaction costs 
that might arise in the context of their contractual relationship. 
6.4.2.5 Uncertainty 
The second of the three parameters that influence the choice of organizational form is un-
certainty. It refers to disturbances of the relationship, requiring adaptation, monitoring or 
renegotiation.
349
 Considering external disturbances first, potential changes in demand could 
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be a trigger for renegotiations. However, none of the interviewees mentioned this as a rele-
vant issue to them. Another source of uncertainty is unexpected decisions by the legisla-
ture.
350
 In North Carolina this has not been a significant problem, at least over the past few 
years. For example, there has been a moratorium on mandated benefits what prevented sig-
nificant changes in this respect.
351
 Furthermore, one interviewed insurance carrier stated 
that insurers usually have broad coverage so that newly mandated benefits frequently do not 
require any changes at all. Besides that, no other external triggers for uncertainty could be 
identified. 
With regard to internal disturbances opportunism is the key term describing potential mis-
behavior that puts pressure on a contractual relationship. However, a first source of unin-
tended, ―honest‖ disagreement arises when the two contractual parties have a different un-
derstanding of what the contract actually means. Due to an increased professionalism on 
both sides, this usually does not pose a problem anymore.
352
 None of the interviewees 
claimed that opportunistic behavior would be a big problem. ―(…) I would say that my ex-
perience is that the vast, vast majority of physicians try to play by the rules.‖353 Within the 
rules providers try to go to the limits of what is acceptable to the insurer, but fraudulent 
behavior is the exception. However, insurers also estimate that the actual level of proce-
dures and tests is 15 % or 20 % higher than it might have to be. This does not seem to be of 
extreme concern for the payers. They prefer to focus on few individual outliers that are like-
ly to bend the rules. Although none of the interviewees did want to classify it as such, non-
compliance with treatment standards is a case of opportunistic behavior, as these efforts, 
which would be in the best interest of patient and third party payer and would be in the spi-
rit of the contract, are not made. 
Another form of uncertainty is reflected in cases in which insurers make amendments to 
their benefit catalogues and physicians fail to recognize this. But usually the patient, not the 
provider, has to endure the consequences. Thus, if a patient receives treatment that is not 
covered by her plan anymore, she has to pay the bill out of pocket. One period of time, 
when some kind of opportunistic behavior of primary care physicians could be observed, 
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was, when North Carolinian insurers attempted capitation payment. The physicians quickly 
and significantly increased their referral rates to specialists, clearly a notion which was not 
intended, when these contracts were established.
354
 No other forms of exploiting the con-
tractual relationship were raised in the interviews or could be encountered in North Carolina 
specific literature. 
Summarizing, it can be stated that there is evidence for opportunistic behavior, but usually 
in a way that stays within the limits of what North Carolinian insurers deem to be tolerable. 
They tend to focus on blunt fraud, only. 
6.4.2.6 Frequency 
The more frequent transactions of one type are conducted by the purchasing entity, the bet-
ter the costs for any kind of governance system can be spread out.
355
 Thus, several argu-
ments that have already been mentioned above become relevant again. Insurers do have a 
large number of contracts with providers. Furthermore, there is rarely a unique case, usually 
there are several of one kind.
356
 Governance methods that were named are, for example, 
benchmarking and peer review panels. Consequently, as soon as the infrastructure is in 
place, such institutions can handle a relatively large number of cases at low variable costs. 
This obviously makes it easier and less costly for insurance companies to establish some 
kind of governance body. 
6.4.3 Preliminary Assessment 
After having established that the insurer and provider are in a principal-agent relationship in 
chapter 4.1, the identified parameters were assessed under the lens of the North Carolinian 
health care market. Interviewees are aware of the difficulties that arise with measuring 
health services and the resulting information asymmetry. Nonetheless, currently this seems 
to be acceptable for insurers as well as for providers, as long as payment methods are not 
linked to these factors. With regard to their risk attitudes it seems as if smaller and/or non-
diversified players are very exposed to risk and consequently have formed larger entities 
over the past decades. These can be considered risk neutral, whereas individual physicians 
or physicians networks which cannot collectively bargain with regard to payments are likely 
to remain risk averse. Various statements made by the interviewees indicate that the va-
riables included in the objective function of providers are a fair representation of their deci-
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 Cf. chapter 3.3.4.4. 
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 See footnotes 346 and 347. 
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sion criteria. For insurers, the quality aspect seems to play a much smaller role than the cost 
aspect. 
Specificity, the first of the three parameters that determine transaction costs of the different 
organizational forms, is of a moderate degree and mainly caused by dedicated assets on the 
provider side. Insurers do not handle investments to any significant extent. Both parties are 
aware of potential internal and external disturbances that can result in uncertainty, but over 
the past few years fairly stable environment and providers, which – as long as not given too 
much freedom – play pretty much by the rules, make this a minor problem. Thus, at least 
from the insurers‘ point of view, opportunistic behavior – set aside rare incidents of fraud – 
is not a problem. Finally, the large number of contracts a single insurance carrier holds, and 
thus a high frequency of transactions, makes it relatively cheap to install a governance me-
chanism. 
After having covered the various parameters in this section, the following chapter presents 
the manifestation of payment methods and organizational form in a purely descriptive man-
ner. 
6.4.4 Verifying or Falsifying Predictions 
6.4.4.1 Incentive Compatibility 
Originally, in the 1970s and 1980s, fee-for-service was the standard and providers filed 
their fees with the insurance companies. Since the start of North Carolina‘s first HMO in 
1984, payment systems went almost through a cycle. In that year, Kaiser Permanente tried 
to establish the state‘s first and only staff model HMO. Salaried physicians worked for the 
carrier, which received a per capita payment for each enrollee. This remained the only true 
prepaid group practice. Competitors who offered HMO plans also paid providers on a capi-
tation basis but never in such a mutually exclusive manner. After 14 years of operation, 
Kaiser Permanente‘s North Carolina branch had to file for bankruptcy. Adverse selection 
effects and resistance from the provider side were only two of several reasons why this en-
deavor failed.
357
 At the end of the 1990s, by and large the boom time of capitation was over. 
The number of insurers offering capitation plans dropped from the peak of 24 in 1997 to 
only 8 that were still actively marketing in 2003.
358
 In North Carolina insurance carriers are 
at large back to fee-for-service payments; in the few cases, in which capitation is still used, 
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 Gitterman, Weiner et al. 2003 give insight into the stages of Kaiser Permanente‘s presence in North 
Carolina and the different reasons for its struggle. 
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 Cf. Greene 2003, p. 22. 
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this is a relict without significant role.
359
 The way fee-for-service is conducted has changed 
significantly. Providers usually do not file their fees any more but insurance companies 
either apply a proprietary fee-schedule or one that is a variation of a public program‘s sys-
tem.
360
 Hospital reimbursement ―was changed from charge-based reimbursement to a varie-
ty of prospective payment methods: per diems, case rates and diagnostic related group 
(DRG) fixed prices.‖361 
What does this mean in terms of the developed reimbursement model? The typical fee 
schedule reimburses individual procedures that were performed. Therefore fee-for-service 
payments are much more closely related to actual costs than a basic residual component G 
(which in this case equals zero), as implemented in the payment function of chapter 4.2.1, 
and thus insulate a physician against financial risk.
362
 
Depending on the extent to which truly prospective reimbursement methods are used for 
hospitals, the basic fee component and thus the financial risk plays a more important role in 
in-patient care. However, it remains open at this point, to what extent this actually describes 
the incentives correctly. One interviewee noted: ―Really what it is, it is a work backwards 
methodology these days. If I am a hospital system and I need X million dollars. I know 
what the government is gonna pay me within some certainty. I can figure out what my cur-
rent group of insurance companies is paying me. And if I need them to pay me 10 % more 
then, basically, it is pretty simple from their standpoint – on the new effective date, which is 
normally January, I got to get 10 % more or I cannot fund the projects that I have going 
on.‖363 
Insurers also acknowledge that it is very difficult to obtain favorable outcomes on a fee-for-
service basis as the incentives are piecework.
364
 Why have insurers returned to this method? 
As one interviewee tried to explain it, highlighting the importance of organizational struc-
tures in the context of more sophisticated payment methods: ―You have to run into an or-
ganization that has infrastructure that can actually achieve things. There is very few of those 
opportunities.‖ 
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 ―[W]e almost sell no HMO anymore, nor do any of our competitors. The HMO was all but dead. What 
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360
 Cf. Greene 2003, p. 24. 
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 Stone 1997, n.p. 
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6.4.4.2 Organizational Form 
Whereas the closing quote of the preceding chapter points out the importance of professio-
nally structured provider organizations, this chapter looks into the relationship between in-
surers and providers. Therefore again the three generic modes – market, hierarchy and hybr-
id – are considered. 
As elaborated in chapter 4.3.2, it is practically impossible to arrange spot market contracting 
by an insurance carrier. The insurance setup that is closest to the market mode (but is incon-
sistent with the assumption of the insurer as direct contractor) is some form of indemnity 
insurance allowing the consumer to contract ―on behalf‖ of the insurance carrier with any 
provider. There are some indemnity plans left in North Carolina; the largest one is part of 
the State Health Plan. However, they play a minor role and are fairly unpopular with em-
ployers, as their only way to control costs are patient cost sharing arrangements. 
A fully integrated hierarchy would imply that providers are actually integral part of the in-
surance company, a feature which can be found in so called Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions. But as the North Carolina Department of Insurance states in one of its reports: ―Al-
though some HMOs employ their own physicians and medical facilities, none of the HMOs 
presently operating in North Carolina do so.‖365 North Carolina is no exception in that in 
almost no area on the east coast staff model HMOs have prevailed.
366
 The only true staff 
model HMO that has ever attempted to enter the North Carolinian market is Kaiser Perma-
nente. However, during its 14 years of presence it never owned a hospital and also had to 
externally contract with specialists.
367
 Furthermore, it seems quite likely that the transaction 
costs of recruiting physicians in the first place were very high, especially as the medical 
community vigorously opposed and defamed this model. With labels like ―physicians-in-a-
box‖ and perceptions that the organization would attract only inept physicians, the HMO 
had a very negative image.
368
 In general, interviewees observed that physicians do have a 
very strong aversion against any direct control, which makes it extremely difficult to force 
them in any strict hierarchical organization that is not led by their peers.
369
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 As one interview participant noted: ―I yet haven‘t figured out how to control physicians. As a bunch, 
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fact of doctors. So I don‘t think control has ever worked. I think you have to figure out how to work with 
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Due to their lack of presence in North Carolina, little can be said about other implications of 
the market and the hierarchy mode, especially as the interviews focused on the current state. 
But all over the nation, including North Carolina, ―[f]inally, a variety of hybrid arrange-
ments has evolved.‖370 
With regard to hybrids, two different approaches can be observed. Some insurers (usually 
smaller or self-insured companies) contract with provider groups or networks, whereas oth-
ers may use intermediaries for negotiations, but contract directly with the individual physi-
cian and thus maintain their own network. In the first case this means that two or even three 
layers of organizations are built in. For example, a large provider network comprises sever-
al, lower level IPA which facilitate issues on a community level. However, management 
tools used by larger provider networks are very similar or are even identical with those used 
by insurance companies, as outlined in the following paragraphs.
371
 
Usually contracts run for one year or occasionally for two years. Generally, these contracts 
are standard forms without significant differences, even across specialties. In a typical con-
tract, parties agree on general terms with regard to quality and costs. Operational details, 
like benefit catalogue or utilization review, are usually added in the form of a provider ma-
nual. Thus, the insurer can make changes to the benefit catalogue without having to file a 
new contract with the Department of Insurance, which improves adaptation efficiency. As 
long as providers are given sufficient notice, insurers can make most of these changes unila-
terally. Furthermore, there usually is a multi-stage control process in place. General infor-
mation technology is used to screen claims data for outliers. If a provider or a case seems 
suspicious, in the contract the insurer reserves the right to conduct audits of cases and files. 
If the case is more serious, organizations have peer review panels to evaluate the facts. As 
last resorts all contracts include the option to unilaterally terminate the contract before its 
regular end. In this case, it is beneficial to have contracted directly with individual provid-
ers, rather than through a network. 
By applying screening mechanisms insurers try to focus on serious problems: ―There are 
two different theories of how to look at that. One is, you can do the same thing to everyone, 
and annoy them all, and we have done that in the past, we subjected all of them to a gate-
keeper. Rather than targeting where the problems actually existed. What we do, we try to 
focus on the top areas of concern. We go through in depth analysis everywhere, what‘s 
going on with our medical costs, what‘s changed, what procedures are driving it, where are 
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to most network organizations that contract with individual physicians. 
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problems popping up. Do we have a hospital out there that is charging U.S. three times as 
much for a hip implant as everybody else is. And then we focus on the problems. What we 
try to do is to leave alone the people who are not a problem. Who are not popping up in the 
financial analysis or quality analysis. And just focus on the ones who are the minority, 
frankly.‖372 
Besides these ex post controls, plans use ex ante utilization measures. Frequently, pre-
certification of certain services are required, which means that providers have to call and 
check with the insurance company before conducting the treatment. Otherwise the patient 
would be at risk to forgo coverage for this treatment. 
6.4.5 Preliminary Assessment 
Summarizing, it can be said that fee-for-service payment is the predominant payment me-
thod for physician. Capitation or residual payment components do not play a significant 
role. Due to limited information the situation for hospitals cannot be finally assessed at this 
point. However, any hospital payment system seems to be dominated by the bargaining 
processes which are characterized by high market concentration on both sides.  
Neither spot market contracting nor hierarchy plays a role in insurer-provider relationships 
in North Carolina. Hybrids are the way these contracts are organized, and their actual im-
plementation fits well with the theory-based definition. Contracts are relational, which 
means that they agree on general terms and assign decision rights, which are supported with 
some bureaucracy to solve any conflicts, usually to the insurer,. Peer review and the use of 
annexes are typical features as outlined in chapter 2.3.4.3 and contribute to adaptation effi-
ciency. The time frame of one year may seem short on the first glance, but considering the 
high inflation in the health sector and other potential disturbances this still qualifies as a 
long term contract. The powerful position of the insurance carriers with the right to enforce 
unilateral decisions is noteworthy, as it definitely has some notions of a hierarchy. 
After having looked at North Carolina‘s peculiar parameters, incentive compatibility and 
organizational forms, the next chapter evaluates the outcomes, which can be observed in 
this very specific setting. The focus is thereby primarily on outcomes resulting from the 
insurer-provider relationship, but other related factors like competitive forces are included 
as well. 
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6.5 General Outcomes 
6.5.1 Access 
Of the three parameters chosen to evaluate access, availability of services was the least 
mentioned by all interviewees. All specialties and types of facilities seem to be available in 
sufficient numbers – if consumers can afford it. However, the ability to pay does ration 
access to healthcare in the U.S.
373
 Besides the fact that payments which are considered too 
low by providers reduce the availability of services, no links between a specific payment 
method and access could be identified. Thus, the following focuses on effects of the con-
tracting mode between insurers and providers. 
Accessibility, introducing the geographic dimension, is closely related to contracting. Hav-
ing left behind a period in which HMO style models restricted choice of providers signifi-
cantly, today the selective long term contracting still channels patients to certain contracted 
providers. However, interviewees unanimously agree that due to consumer demand insurers 
are now forced to entertain widespread physician networks. ―The market said, the definition 
of access is, ‗my doctor is in there‘‖374 and ―[s]o competition to get doctors into the network 
is really the only thing that helps consumers‖375 are two typical remarks.376 They further-
more acknowledge that geographic closeness is crucial. However, that insurers are aware of 
the importance of easy access does not mean that they try to achieve this in all geographic 
areas. Many rural areas in North Carolina are simply not profitable enough, therefore pro-
viders who may be licensed to do business in a certain county do not have a network in 
these areas.
377
 Thus, the power of insurers to contract significantly improves accessibility 
for consumer in densely populated urban areas, but largely fails in rural and poorer parts of 
the state. In the latter ones, providers rely heavily on income through public programs like 
Medicaid, and consumers receive services through publicly financed rural health clinics and 
similar facilities. Furthermore, insurance coverage that is available in these regions is less 
likely to embrace significant care management. 
The effects of hybrid mode insurer-provider contracting on affordability are mixed. On the 
one side, people who do have coverage benefit from discounted prices. However, the ability 
of insurers to work with providers on prices is again restricted to the more competitive, ur-
ban areas. On the other side, there are no significant differences between carriers with re-
gard to provider contracting. Consequently, the only way for insurance companies to diffe-
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377
 ―Just like putting an IKEA store in rural NC, it wouldn‘t make lots of money.‖ Interview. 
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rentiate premium prices is through varying co-pays and deductibles. Such plans usually do 
not help low income people, as the out-of-pocket payments are beyond what they can af-
ford.
378
 Another problem with regard to affordability is the consumers‘ lack of ability to 
find the cheapest adequate option. One reason for this is the complexity of health insurance 
packages per se. Another reason is that providers bar insurers from communicating the pric-
es they charge. So there are no means for consumers to shop around based on price infor-
mation at all, or to argue an inaccurate bill afterwards, a fact which insurer-provider con-
tracting seems to be incapable of overcoming.
379
 Problems also arise, when patients mista-
kenly see physicians who are not part of the network, and then face high out-of-pocket 
fees.
380
 Generally spoken, affordability of insurance premiums is one of the key consumer 
struggles patient advocates are confronted with. 
6.5.2 Costs 
With regard to costs it is difficult to separate the effects of the commonly used fee-for-
services payment method, the backward accounting approach, and pure organizational fea-
tures. The lack of a residual component in the payment system takes away an important 
incentive for physicians to hold down costs. When talking about cost control most intervie-
wees refer to the introduction of large scale utilization review and similar measures, which 
led to significant savings – one-time savings as critics say. The measures could not avoid 
that health care costs grew again steadily over the past few years, frequently featuring 
double digit figures.
381
 As one participant stated: ―If you looked at our costs per day in a 
hospital, today versus six years ago, it‘s doubled. In some markets, more than doubled.‖382 
Independent of the actual contractual setup, insurers were able to channel through provid-
ers‘ price hikes, thereby maintaining constant medical cost ratios and solid profit margins, 
and thus not facing the need to put providers under significant financial pressure.
383
 Fur-
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thermore, interviewees observed that providers compete for consumers and thus ultimately 
for insurer contracts mainly through quality and brand building advertising. ―In terms of ‗I 
want to be the lowest cost system in town‘ – we have not seen it.‖384 Thus, applying a bene-
fit catalogue which excludes particularly expensive procedures seems to be the core of cost 
saving measures in place. Especially as insurers do not seem to be willing to go after poten-
tial savings that are frankly possible but might cause some opposition from the provider 
side. They rather focus on some high cost areas and start single initiatives. Some argue that 
these initiatives are public relations oriented rather than serious efforts to cut costs or im-
prove quality. No interviewee indicated that transaction cost efficiency of the hybrid struc-
ture had any significant effects.
385
 
Summarizing, costs seem to rise steadily in North Carolina neither constrained through a 
payment system, nor through organizational form. 
Another factor is regulation that ensures certain quality standards for consumers. ―However, 
to the extent that the cost of these protections renders insurance unaffordable for some, pro-
tecting the public good is less straightforward, since it creates winners (those who remain 
insured and enjoy these new protections, whether or not they ever directly benefit from 
them) and losers (those who can no longer afford insurance).‖386 In consequence, the next 
chapter elaborates on the extent to which the North Carolina typical insurer-provider rela-
tionship affects the quality aspect. 
6.5.3 Quality 
Considering the advantages of ex ante measures for quality improvement the lack of incen-
tivizing payment systems does not promise best quality effects.
387
 At least to date, quality 
related incentives are restricted to certain projects, and even there they are mainly linked to 
input measures like the adherence to certain guidelines. 
One interviewee commented: ―From the quality perspective our networks are almost iden-
tical between U.S., BCBS, Signa, Aetna, United, you know, going down the list, whoever is 
still left. So it is not like I am aligning with a different set of providers, we are working to-
gether to build a different quality system, because we are not. (…) We really don‘t have a 
lot of competition to build better quality delivery systems. We really – as an industry – 
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utility function was assumed a complete cost sharing increases quality. However, as neither C(q) nor 
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that quality measures even exceeds the efficient level. 
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leave that up to the providers themselves to do that. We do a little back end monitoring, we 
look for bad outcomes and things of that nature, but it‘s fairly rudimentary.‖388 Although 
this is probably a strong indication that the effect of insurer-provider contracting on quality 
is limited, it does not necessarily mean that there is no impact at all. When insurers file a 
new contract with the Department of Insurance, they often at least claim that these changes 
will benefit the patient.
389
 Through the strong position they ensure themselves in the way 
the contracts are set up, they also have the means to intervene, if providers do not adhere to 
certain quality expectations. This obviously would be much more difficult, if no hybrid typ-
ical support structure was in place. And as they do write quality into general terms in their 
contracts and in a more detailed manner into the provider manuals, this has the potential to 
spread best practices over the provider community.
390
 Furthermore, there are some quality 
based initiatives which include provider participation in agreeing on quality levels and in-
centive pay for providers complying with certain standards. However, the drive for such 
initiatives also often comes out of public programs like Medicaid. 
There may be another advantage, if insurers were responsible for quality on a large scale as 
it focuses the public awareness. In this context, one interviewee stated that most changes are 
driven by entrepreneurial insight rather than regulations. And ―[s]ome of these entrepre-
neurial insights occurred on the front page of the News & Observer.‖391 As one interview 
participant pointed out, insurers prefer to focus on quality improvements with regard to pre-
vention, rather than with regard to actual case management, as this causes less irritation 
with providers.
392
 
The comprehensiveness of the benefit catalogue may also be a quality indicator. In this re-
spect insurers in North Carolina seem to cover by and large a satisfying spectrum which is 
also ensured by state regulation.
393
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A negative aspect of insurer-provider contracting on the quality of care that has been men-
tioned several times is the disruption of care in cases when consumers want to switch insur-
ance carriers, but their physician only has a contract with the old one. 
In conclusion, one might say that, besides the continuity aspect, quality of care is not nega-
tively influenced by the prevalent type of insurer-provider contracting, rather that it usually 
is at least as good as in other potential settings and sometimes even better. 
6.6 Preliminary Assessment 
It is obviously difficult to isolate the effects of payment method and contractual hybrid 
mode on the different general outcome parameters. Many confounding variables, like com-
petition and bargaining patterns, play a significant role. Incentive compatibility seems to be 
of limited importance, as far as access is concerned. With regard to contracting only the 
aspect accessibility seems to be influenced in a relevant manner. Thus, in a first step selec-
tive contracting reduces access, whereas in a second step consumer demand and competi-
tion force insurers to systematically contract providers to ensure adequate access in all re-
gions they operate in. Fee-for-service provides almost no incentives for controlling costs, 
and thus rising costs are not very surprising. The need to contract with insurers on a longer 
term basis does not seem to hold costs down either, whereas market power and competition 
aspects play such an important role. Some aspects, like the media enforced quality steward-
ship of insurers, benefit the general quality of health care delivery. Insurers would less like-
ly take on this role if there was not a strong contractual responsibility which is given 
through the hybrid construct. 
What does all this mean for the overall goal to have basic health care for everybody? The 
current payment system does not support it, especially through the negative effect on costs 
and the unclear effects on the quality measures conducted by providers. Insurer-provider 
contracting helps to define a basic benefit catalogue which excludes excessively expensive 
procedures but maintains a sufficient quality level. Nonetheless, hybrid contracting itself 
does not seem to support the goal to make this basic health care available to everybody. 
Although improving access to care for some, especially in densely populated and richer 
areas, rural regions seem to loose out. Furthermore, there is no beneficial effect on costs 
which would make healthcare affordable to a larger group of people.
394
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7 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
7.1 Approach 
This chapter provides a direct confrontation of theory with reality as observed in North 
Carolina. First, assumptions and predictions are evaluated. The focus is especially laid on 
discrepancies, and trying to elaborate their implications. Secondly, some potential reasons 
for these findings are given. This leads directly to the next section which highlights limita-
tions of this study and identifies areas which might benefit from further research. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present synopses of the various assumptions and predictions, respec-
tively, which were made in the course of this paper. In a highly simplified way these tables 
contrast the theory-based findings with the observations and perceptions collected in North 
Carolina. Consequently, the classifications should not be regarded as a very precise and as 
the only possible conclusion of this discussion. In fact, the main purpose is to identify dis-
crepancies between theory-based statements and real-world experience in a concise manner. 
7.2 Theory versus Reality in North Carolina 
7.2.1 Assumptions 
In Table 3 key assumptions are grouped into the two main categories incentive compatibili-
ty and organizational form.
395
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ASSUMPTIONS   based on Theory North Carolina 
with regard to   
Incentive Compatibility   
Measurability difficult difficult 
Information asymmetry high high 
Risk for small providers high high 
  large providers low ambiguous 
  insurers low low 
Risk attitude of small providers averse averse 
  large providers neutral neutral 
  insurers neutral neutral 
Variables of objective function 
 Provider income 
 
yes 
 
yes 
  quality yes yes 
  effort yes yes 
 Insurer income yes yes 
  quality yes unclear 
Organizational Form   
Specificity of investments 
 Provider site specificity 
 
none 
 
none 
  physical assets low low 
  human assets low low 
  dedicated assets moderate significant 
  intangible assets none none 
 Insurer site specificity low none 
  physical assets low none 
  human assets low none 
  dedicated assets none none 
  intangible assets low none 
Uncertainty  externally moderate low 
  internally from 
   providers 
 
moderate 
 
moderate 
   insurers moderate moderate 
Frequency high high 
Table 3: Comparison of Theory and Reality with regard to Assumptions 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Most of the first group‘s assumptions on incentive compatibility seem to fit fairly well, al-
though one assumption may have to be stated more clearly: In chapter 3.3.3.3 it is con-
cluded that large providers are risk neutral, for which, in addition to large hospitals, physi-
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cian networks were named as examples. However, at least in the way physician networks 
operate under North Carolinian and federal law, a substantial financial risk remains with the 
individual physician, even if she is part of a large network. This means that physicians who 
are also part of a network have to be considered as risk averse, depending on the circums-
tances. 
Of the two objective functions defined in chapter 3.3.3.2 the function for providers, for 
which income, quality and efforts are decisive parameters, has been confirmed. On the in-
surers‘ side, the quality parameter needs further consideration. The quality aspect does not 
seem to feed directly into the players‘ utility score. Quality seems to be of significant, but 
indirect relevance for the insurer, mainly via marketing and public relations considerations. 
A more precise definition of the term ‗quality‘ would be necessary to see if the results of 
this particular form of quality motivation meets consumers‘ interests. However, as intervie-
wees made differing statements, this remains unclear at this stage.
396
 
The second part of Table 3 refers to aspects related to organizational form. On the provider 
side, dedicated assets are the only parameter with a noteworthy discrepancy. In the theory 
part of this paper, dedicated assets have been identified as a potential source of moderate 
relation-specific investments. However, the interviews have indicated that this is a very 
significant aspect for providers, too. Their ability to flexibly adjust capacities seems to be 
limited. Specificity of investments on the insurer side was assumed to be fairly low, but 
across all parameters the perception gained in the interviews is that it is most likely even 
lower than anticipated or that there is none at all. Thus, although slightly overestimated, the 
general assessment of specific investments, stating only a very low degree of specificity, is 
accurate. External uncertainty is perceived to be very low as well. 
7.2.2 Predictions 
Predictions are summarized in Table 4. Thereby the choice of payment method and contrac-
tual mode targets the first part of the research question, societal impact the second part. 
Considering the trade-off between incentive intensity and risk premium the prediction for 
small and thus risk averse providers was a significant cost-sharing component as part of the 
payment method. Here, it is not surprising that capitation payments (for example in form of 
non-group HMO plans which contract physicians on a capitation basis) are almost not 
present at all. However, the fact that insurers in North Carolina pay their small providers 
(i.e. physicians) purely on a fee-for-service basis that equates a complete cost sharing has 
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 For the reasons given in chapter 3.2.4, no more precise definition of quality was elaborated, as this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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not been expected. As far as only those parameters are considered which were developed in 
the theory part of this paper, this indicates that the implemented payment mode is not effi-
cient. Unfortunately, only limited information could be collected on large providers (i.e. 
especially hospitals). Thus, no final assessment can be made with regard to this aspect. 
However, it seems as if the mix of different payment systems as described in chapter 6.4.4.1 
could potentially accommodate an incentive compatible scheme. 
PREDICTIONS  based on Theory North Carolina 
with regard to   
Payment Method and Contractual 
Mode   
Payment with …… cost sharing 
 for small providers 
 
significant 
 
complete 
 for large providers low unclear 
Hybrid yes yes 
Societal Impact   
Access availability moderate positive none 
  accessibility moderate positive ambiguous 
  affordability moderate positive low positive 
Costs positive ambiguous 
Quality moderate positive ambiguous 
Basic coverage for everybody by 
 defining basic 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 enabling everybody yes ambiguous 
Table 4: Comparison of Theory and Reality with regard to Predictions 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
It is noteworthy that a hybrid arrangement is the efficient contractual mode not only accord-
ing to theory, but that this mode has actually been realized by the insurers in North Caroli-
na. Although HMOs are also present in other parts of the United States, it seems likely that 
such organizations can prosper only under very specific circumstances. This is supported by 
the fact that besides health care no other industry vertically integrates insurance and provi-
sion functions.
397
 
With regard to societal impact, theory-based predictions were slightly more optimistic than 
could be confirmed. Although all of them estimated to be moderately influenced in a posi-
tive way, the access criteria did not live up to the expectations. Thus, no effect on availabili-
ty has been observed and affordability is likely to be influenced only on a low level. Acces-
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sibility is improved for some, especially for people in urban and affluent areas, whereas 
rural regions are likely to suffer, consequently showing an ambiguous picture. 
Although theory predicted a positive effect on costs, especially based on ex ante incentives, 
but at least to a low degree also through ex post control measures, the observed facts are 
ambiguous. First of all, the use of a fee-for-service method does not restrain the rising costs. 
Secondly, although insurers apply cost control measures within their contractual relations 
they do not strive to realize all potential savings. 
The reliance on ex post measures for quality control indicates that insurers forgo potential 
quality achievements, although overall quality outcomes seem to be slightly positive. This 
aspect might need further investigation.
398
 
Focusing on the overall societal goal to ensure basic coverage for everyone, insurers seem 
to do a fairly good job of defining a basic but sufficient service. However, the results on 
enabling everyone to have basic health care are ambiguous. On the one hand, taking an op-
timistic point of view, there is a positive cost effect, which makes it easier for public entities 
to provide subsidies for people in financial need. On the other hand, the performance on the 
access side is not very convincing, potentially bringing even more people into situations in 
which they have to rely on public support. 
Although most assumptions seem to be on target, the predictions are less precise. Does this 
mean that the model does not identify the most incentive compatible and cost efficient solu-
tion, or that North Carolinian insurers decide against these specific aspects in favor of other 
factors? The following sections cover some potential explanations. 
7.3 Potential Explanations 
7.3.1 Interdependency of Organizational Form and Parameters 
A potential fundamentally critical observation made during the course of this research 
project was the fact that specificity of investments was frequently created through the mode 
of organization which had been chosen, thus reversing the dependency relation of the mod-
el. In other words: The stronger the contractual integration is – locating the mode still with-
in the boundaries of a hybrid model, but closer to a hierarchical structure by assigning more 
powers to the insurer – the more relation-specific features are generally implemented. This 
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 Similar conclusions can be found elsewhere: ―Selective contracting has allowed managed care plans to 
obtain lower prices from hospitals. This finding is generalizable beyond California and is stronger when 
there is more competition in the hospital market. (…) Little research on the effects on quality has been 
undertaken, but preliminary evidence suggests that hospital quality has not declined and may have im-
proved.‖ Morrisey 2001, p. 191. 
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can be reporting procedures, more sophisticated clinical guidelines, or internal review pa-
nels – all of which require relation-specific investments. 
Considering a market without high concentration on the provider side, a potential line of 
argument could thus be similar to the following: A moderate, but significant degree of in-
ternal uncertainty triggers the need for stronger ex post control, as ex ante incentive align-
ment does not seem to be a favored option. This ex post control is achieved by the creation 
of certain bureaucratic structures which support the contractual relationship, thus entering a 
hybrid mode. This step can de facto be mandated by the insurers because they are in a 
stronger position than providers. By making relation-specific investments the need for safe-
guarding the relationship and thus for stronger control measures increases even further. In 
this context it is important that the relation-specific investments are almost exclusively 
made by (frequently small) providers, thus giving the insurance companies an even stronger 
position. This creates a significant unbalance, which is contradictory to Ménard 2005, who 
argues that hybrids have a potential to overcome many contractual hazards efficiently as 
they create mutual dependency.
399
 The only option for providers seems to be to consolidate 
and increase their bargaining power. 
Although further investigation of this argument would help to improve and validate the 
model, at this stage it does not seem to disqualify any conclusions, especially as in chapter 
6.4.2 precautions are taken to minimize the effects of this interdependency. 
7.3.2 Relation of Incentive Compatibility and Organizational Form 
In the course of this paper two different aspects, ex ante incentive compatibility and ex post 
control measures with a strong focus on transaction cost efficiency, are applied. So far these 
two issues have been considered as largely independent. However, it has to be evaluated 
whether incentive compatibility through an according payment system and transaction cost 
efficiency are complementary, or if they present a trade-off that potentially could confound 
results. 
The first option seems to be more likely for several reasons. No matter which contractual 
mode is chosen, transaction costs rise with an increase in specificity and, in this context 
especially relevant, in uncertainty. Thus, any measures that decrease uncertainty also reduce 
transaction costs. Consequently, a payment system which reduces internal uncertainty alle-
viates the need for ex post measures and thus allows for a less strongly integrated contrac-
tual form. This again is quite likely to positively affect providers that then have to assume 
less relation-specific investments. However, some basic bureaucratic support of a hybrid 
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model benefits the capability of a working incentive pay system. Otherwise a relatively high 
degree of cost sharing has to be accepted, due to the risk-averseness of smaller providers. 
To fine-tune and maintain this delicate balance between incentive strength and risk pre-
mium a reliable stream of information and data which can be validated is required, a func-
tion which can best be facilitated by some form of hybrid. 
Consequently, rather than presenting a trade-off, transaction-efficient contractual hybrids 
and incentive compatible payment methods seem to form a beneficial symbiosis.
400
 
7.3.3 Flawed Assessment of Parameters 
Another reason for the discrepancies between theory-based predictions and real results are 
the assumptions which were made in the first place. If the assumed characteristics of certain 
parameters are different from the ones observed, it is quite likely that the derived predic-
tions are inaccurate as well. Consequently, insurers might still act in accordance with the 
research hypothesis. 
The first discrepancy in Table 3 with regard to risk and risk attitude is not very severe. It 
remains unlikely that even for small providers the incentive pay component is completely 
eliminated. 
The unclear interpretation of the quality component of the insurer‘s objective function is 
likely to explain some of the less positive than expected outcomes on a societal level. A 
smaller than expected interest of insurers into quality issues could explain the prevalence of 
fee-for-service which is not suitable to achieve an optimal quality level. On a larger scale, it 
might be an indicator that insurers do not necessarily act as the perfect agents of consumers, 
as assumed for methodological reasons in chapter 3.3.3.1. 
Other discrepancies only relate to transaction cost aspects and are marginal. Furthermore, 
the contractual mode does present a match between theory and observed reality. 
Thus, a flawed assessment of parameters does not seem to be able to explain all discrepan-
cies in the predictions section. Besides assessing the chosen parameters inadequately, se-
lecting wrong parameters in the first place could pose another reason for inconsistent con-
clusions. The following chapter evaluates this important aspect.  
7.3.4 Omission of Relevant Parameters in the Model 
7.3.4.1 Revenue Consequences 
The economic theory used in this paper focuses almost exclusively on transaction costs.
401
 
Acknowledging the limitations of this approach, this still seems to be a reasonable attempt, 
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especially as it might shed some light on an area which has not yet received sufficient atten-
tion, as Williamson’s conclusion suggests: ―(…) first-order economizing – effective adapta-
tion and elimination of waste – has been neglected. Adaptation is especially crucial.‖402 
Nonetheless, various other aspects like economies of scope, or generally the consideration 
of revenues obviously play a decisive role in any management decision. Therefore they 
cannot be completely disregarded at this point. Focusing again on discrepancies between 
theory and observations from North Carolina, the aspect of revenue consequences may help 
to explain some of the insufficiencies with regard to the prediction of societal outcomes. 
Theory indicates that a hybrid mode, implicitly meaning selective contracting, has a posi-
tive impact on accessibility. However, although a hybrid structure reduces the risk of in-
vestments in remote, rural areas – thus being still the relatively most efficient option of the 
three generic contractual modes – the low (if any) profitability of a business endeavor in 
such a region outweighs these benefits. 
This is also relevant for the aspects affordability and costs. Although the cost efficient im-
plementation of utilization review and of similar measures helps to control costs it does not 
mean that an insurance carrier has the economic capability to provide sustainable coverage 
for any pocket. 
Though these issues were not considered in this paper, their potentially significant influence 
indicates the need for further investigation before a final conclusion can be drawn. 
7.3.4.2 Market Characteristics 
Another area of future research is market characteristics. The sheer frequency with which 
issues such as concentration, competition, and market and bargaining power are mentioned 
in this paper highlights the importance of this matter. Although New Institutional Econom-
ics provide tools to adjust the theory model for any of these aspects the scope of this project 
has limited the analysis to focus on the main research questions. 
An aspect related to the insurers‘ objective function is their ability to pass on price hikes to 
consumers. Although increasing profits is one of their objectives, they can achieve this goal 
without being forced to apply pressure on prices in order to keep costs low. 
Another key concern is that, even if the results of the model fit fairly well, the model might 
not catch other aspects that dominate considerations like transaction costs. There were mul-
tiple indications that this might be the case. When asked if he believed that issues like mar-
ket power dominate questions of renegotiation risk of contracts, an interviewee‘s answer 
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was a clear cut ―[s]ure!‖403 Several (quasi) bilateral monopolies in the North Carolinian 
market and a bargaining process that is frequently characterized as a backward accounting 
method do strongly suggest that these factors play an extremely relevant role, not only in 
general, but also with regard to the way payment systems are set up and the mode in which 
contractual relations are organized. Furthermore, conclusions like the prospect of cost sav-
ings can only be maintained in a sustainable manner, if a competitive market environment 
without market entrance and exit barriers exists. 
7.3.4.3 Other Factors 
Another source of influence which has not been explicitly accounted for are informal insti-
tutions of any kind. For example, the self-concept of the medical profession has significant 
impact on which form of organizations they prefer. Ideals like autonomy make it generally 
hard to mandate anything on physicians. In consequence the opposition of the professional 
bodies occasionally actively discourages or even prohibits physicians to participate in cer-
tain types of organizations, as for example seen in the resistance against group model 
HMOs. Economic considerations often take the backseat under such circumstances. This 
might explain why the fee-for-service system has prevailed, although it does not produce 
optimal results. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that insurers know about the advantages of capitations pay-
ments and appreciate those. However, the risk of unintended consequences like cream-
skimming is seen as too high.
404
 It is unclear if the measures provided in a hybrid are indeed 
not sufficient or if insurers for other reasons do just not want to face the challenges which 
come with such a payment system. 
Additionally, there remains a vast array of other potential explanatory variables. Thus, this 
section is concluded with a quote of Ménard 2005 which gives insight into current academ-
ic focus and aligns with the author‘s opinion on these issues: ―[We] need more empirical 
studies, identifying and measuring relevant proxies in order to assess the role of these va-
riables and their impact. (…) [M]ost tests so far have focused on the role of specific invest-
ments, at the sector level. Looking at other variables and digging into data at the firm level 
or at the level of inter-firm agreements involve difficulties that need to be dealt with.‖405 
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ledge, and the benefits of market monitoring. These suggestions are tentative, and we confess that they 
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7.4 Further Limitations and Alternative Approaches 
Several limitations have been raised in the preceding chapters, mostly directed at the eco-
nomic theory which was used and the confounding variables that have been encountered 
when investigating the situation in North Carolina. Generally, it has to be stated that the 
scope of this research was broad, comprising various aspects and different methodological 
approaches. Thus, many aspects could not be elaborated in desirable depth. 
Other limitations come with the way the real-world example is approached. North Carolina 
has various specific characteristics which make the results difficult to generalize. Although 
the interviews provide a substantial amount of information, several caveats apply. The 
number of interviewees is fairly low and although they were carefully selected for their ex-
pertise and their statements were validated through literature research and independent ex-
perts, a bias is likely to remain. For example, no large hospital system was represented. 
For all these reasons it seems to be sound to understand this paper as an exploratory re-
search project. More precisely targeted investigations can be conducted with the insight 
gained from this project. In addition to a new round of qualitative interviews with more 
focused questions and a larger number of participants, it might be interesting to see if em-
pirical data can be obtained to validate some of the assumptions made in a more robust and 
rigorous manner. 
8 Conclusion 
Among the various ways the stewardship role for patients can be assigned in a health sys-
tem, the designation of private health insurers is one option. In order to evaluate the impli-
cations of such an approach, the scope of this paper was to test the hypothesis as outlined in 
chapter 1.2: In a market driven health system insurers find efficient ways of coordinating 
their contractual relationships with providers by pursuing appropriate forms of vertical 
integration. The thereby emerging organizations do this by efficiently overcoming problems 
posed through diverging interests and incentives. This helps to accomplish social goals as 
defined by the society, i.e. guaranteeing all citizens basic coverage. 
To this end, first a theory-based framework has been developed, which is based on princip-
al-agent and transaction cost theory. This has not only highlighted a range of parameters 
which had been assumed to be relevant for the decision making of actors under such cir-
cumstances. It has also pointed out – in abstract terms – how incentive compatibility can be 
achieved and which generic modes of organizing a contractual relationship are available. 
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For the latter, specificity of investments has been identified as a particularly important pa-
rameter to determine the efficient mode for each constellation. 
The theory-based specification of the various parameters for the health sector have hig-
hlighted the importance of uncertainty and found mild forms of specific investments. 
Based on these findings, theory-based predictions have been made. Incentive compatibility 
is achieved through a payment system which combines a cost sharing with a residual com-
ponent. To obtain efficient results the trade-off between incentive power and risk premium 
has to be fine-tuned according to the actors‘ risk attitudes. Due to a relatively low degree of 
specificity of investments and a moderate level of uncertainty as well as a high frequency of 
transactions on the insurance side, a hybrid is the efficient contractual mode. 
In the context of the research question this indicates an efficient way to coordinate the con-
tractual relationship as well as how to overcome diverging incentives in an efficient man-
ner. Furthermore, taking together both aspects, the impact on the overall societal goal to 
guarantee basic health care for everybody seems to be at least slightly positive. 
As the aim had not only been to make theory-based conclusions, but also to validate these 
with results in a real-world scenario, North Carolina has served as a benchmark. The excur-
sus on the U.S. health system has highlighted aspects which are important to understand the 
current situation, ranging from the role of public programs to the significant concentration 
in the health insurance market. 
Of the various assumptions and parameters under consideration most have been confirmed 
through the observations made during the interviews and retrieved from North Carolina 
specific literature. The characterization of providers‘ risk attitudes would certainly benefit 
from greater differentiation which allows for the unique situation of physicians in networks. 
The largest discrepancy is related to the insurers‘ objective function and the role quality 
aspects play in it. In addition, the degree of relation-specific investments even seems to be 
slightly lower than expected. 
The findings with regard to incentive compatibility and ex ante incentivizing revealed a 
major discrepancy. Only hospital payments, which use a mix of residual and cost sharing 
methods, seem to follow incentive compatibility considerations, although this could not be 
fully clarified. Physician payments rely completely on a fee-for-service system and there-
with eliminate almost all efficiency oriented ex ante incentives. Although theory predicted a 
relatively high cost-sharing component this clearly is a contradiction and indicates the 
choice of a payment method that does not align incentives between insurer and provider and 
thus causes inefficiencies. 
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Contrary to this, the findings with regard to the contractual mode are in accordance with 
theory which predicted hybrid organizations. Insurers offer one to two year contracts, which 
line out the relationship in general terms. Annexes are used to define details and bureaucrat-
ic structures, like peer review panels, are in place. In summary, this seems to be a close to 
ideal match with theory-based predictions. 
Looking at the outcomes of these arrangements on a societal level, the results are not as 
good as expected, although overall there seems to be a slightly positive effect. Insurers do 
work to eliminate unnecessary and expensive treatments from their benefit catalogue, but 
not everybody can necessarily benefit, as for example access in rural areas may suffer. 
It is not possible to finally assess the situation in North Carolina, as a range of other factors 
has been identified which quite likely interfere with the results. Unfortunately, the scope of 
this paper has not allowed the investigation of all of them in the necessary depth. Market 
power and concentration, the exclusion of revenue consequences, the role of public pro-
grams, and the assumption of perfect agency by insurance companies are only some of the 
caveats that apply. So it may be quite likely the case that the predictions of the transaction 
cost model match well with the results in North Carolina, but that the true reasons are other 
ones. It could be that physician opposition and administrative easiness are the only reasons 
for the presence of pay-for-performance, but other factors could have influenced these deci-
sions as well. Finally, the case of North Carolina is very specific and may not represent av-
erage markets very well. 
Thus, this paper can neither finally confirm nor discard the hypothesis stated at the begin-
ning of this chapter. Further research is needed to investigate these issues and to hopefully 
produce better evidence. This paper should provide a good basis for such an undertaking, as 
it gives an overview of a wide range of aspects. 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Interview Outline 
Question 1: 
How would you characterize the competitiveness of the health care market in North Caro-
lina since 1993 with regard to its different segments (group/individual insurance and 
providers)? 
Prompt 1: 
Contrasting entrepreneurial freedom and regulation – is it a rather free market? 
Question 2: 
2.1 Looking at the relationship between insurance company and provider. Which party is 
the one that is more likely to offer a contract to the other one? 
2.2 Is it likely that after the contract has been established the provider/insurer shows oppor-
tunistic behavior and if yes, which measures are commonly taken to avoid this? 
Question 3: 
Looking at the trends since 1993 – how have insurance companies‘ contractual relations 
with providers of medical services changed and what were the main reasons for these 
developments? 
Prompt 1: 
Have certain new entrepreneurial insights supported these changes? 
Question 4: 
4.1 Do (contractual) relations between insurance companies and providers vary with regard 
to specificity of investments? 
4.2 Do these differences with regard to specificity of investments result in different kind of 
contracts? 
Question 5: 
5.1 What are the main effects of competition and insurer-provider contracting on consum-
er? 
5.2 Looking at different forms of structuring the insurer-provider relationship (reimburse-
ment, managed care, HMOs) – are there specific advantages or disadvantages for con-
sumers that go along with one form or another? 
Question 6: 
The late Milton Freedman once said: ―The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits‖.406 What are your thoughts about this statement? 
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